# IBN TAYMIYYAH EXPOUNDS ON ISLAM

Selected Writings of Shaykh al-Islam
Taqi ad-Din Ibn Taymiyyah
on Islamic Faith, Life, and Society

Compiled and translated by
Muhammad 'Abdul-Haqq Ansari
Edited By IslamFuture

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

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**THE COMPASSIONATE THE MERCIFUL**

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## FOREWORD

All praise and thanks belong to Allah, and may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon the Messenger of Allah.

The pride and honor of every nation is concentrated in two main principles: The first is the principle of upright and sound thought for the Muslims. The infallible Divine Revelation exemplifies this. The second is the principle of the carriers of the thought and its leaders. They are the scholars of Islamic law (Sharī'ah). For this reason praise of knowledge and its people came in the Noble Qur'ān and the pure prophetic Sunnah. Allah, the Exalted, said: "Allah bears witness that none has the right to be worshiped but He, and the angels and those having knowledge (also give this witness); He always maintains His creation in justice. None has the right to be worshiped but He, the All-Mighty, the All-Wise" [3:18]. He also said: "It is only those who have knowledge among His slaves who fear Allah" [35:28]. And in the authentic *ḥadīth*: "Truly the scholars are the heirs to the prophets. Truly the prophets did not leave behind dinars or dirhams (to be inherited); rather they left knowledge. So whoever takes it has taken an immense portion of good."

Islamic thought, by which I mean the thought of the Muslims, has gone through many different stages with regard to remaining upright or deviating. Thus there were successive stages in which Islamic thought was pure and enlightened. We also notice other states in which Islamic thought had been struck with confusion and deviance.

One of the periods when Islamic thought was not enlightened was in the seventh and eighth centuries of the Hijrah. Blind zeal and weakness of thought were widespread in Islamic society, as

well as the strengthening of innovation (*bid'ah*) and superstition. There was also division in the community and empowerment of the external enemies of Islam.

In the shadow of these difficult conditions Imām Aḥmad Ibn 'Abdul-Ḥalīm Ibn 'Abdus-Salām Ibn Taymīyyah Al-Ḥarranī (d. 728 H.) appeared. He was brilliant of mind, sharply intelligent, pure of thought, strong in reasoning and encyclopedic in knowledge, all these coupled with his complete uprightness in religion and character. His supporters as well as his opponents all bore witness to these facts. This made him fit for the exploration of a distinguished school of thought that mirrored the Salafī school and its methodology in the first three generations of Islam. It is the same school of thought upon which Muḥammad Ibn 'Abdul-Wahhāb based his call to Islam and that which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was based upon before and is based upon now.

This imām wrote on numerous fields of Islamic knowledge: in the fields of belief and thought, worship and social life, and character and good manners. He also wrote in other fields that assisted with the fundamental fields, such as logic, language, and the like. His works were elevated, with strong academic style, precise verification and objective arguments.

It is from this viewpoint that the University saw it appropriate to choose selections from his scholarly legacy and compile them into a single book. This was done to make it easy for the seekers of knowledge to obtain this information, also to make the noble reader aware of and turn his sights to this immense knowledge which has not ceased to be a minaret of light by which the reformists, scholars, callers to Islam and others are guided.

The University entrusted the selection process as well as the translation to Dr. Muḥammad 'Abdul-Ḥaqq Anṣārī, Researcher in the Deanery of Academic Research, who has put forth a great

effort that is well worth mentioning and for which he is to be thanked. The University then entrusted the final review process, the editing, printing and publication of the work to the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America, which is a branch of the University.

I ask Allah to cause benefit to come through this book. I also thank the Deanery of Academic Research at the University for its great efforts in the field of authorship, translation and publication, and I thank the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in the Washington area for reviewing and publishing the book.

Allah is sufficient for us, and He is the best trustee.

Dr. Muhammad Ibn Sa`ad Al-Salem , Rector ,
Al-Imām Muḥammad Ibn Sa'ūd Islamic University

## PREFACE

The history of Islam is a history of struggle between Islam and *jāhilīyyah,* ignorance. *Jāhilīyyah* invades Islam with its ideas and forces; it enters the body and the soul of Islam; it distorts its faith; it upsets its values; it changes its life style; it undermines its institutions; it weakens its impulse; and it alters its image. To counteract this invasion, people with clear perceptions of Islamic ideas, values, life and institutions have appeared at various periods in Islamic history. They have fought the *jāhilīyyah* on various fronts, defeated its forces, and revived and reinvigorated Islam. They are hailed as *mujaddid*, or renewer, of the religion, following a *ḥadīth* of the Prophet to that effect. Shaykh al-Islām Taqī ad-Dīn Ibn Taymīyyah was one of those great personalities of Islam; he occupies a place of honor among them.

For various reasons the West has not been able to appreciate Ibn Taymīyyah's place in Islam. His criticism of Ash'arī *kalām*, Greek logic and philosophy, monistic Ṣūfism, Shī'ī doctrines, and Christian faith have proved great obstacles to appreciating his contribution. His way of writing has also been to an extent responsible. Most of his writings are short or long responsa (*fatāwā*) to particular questions, often recurring, put to him by different men at different times, rather than planned, systematic works on particular subjects. This makes the appreciation of his contribution somewhat difficult. Henri Laoust in France was the first to take serious notice of him. Since the publication of his *Essay on the Social and Political Doctrines of Ibn Taymīyyah* (1939), a few articles and books have appeared on Ibn Taymīyyah's thought, but they are far from giving any clear idea

of his overall contribution to Islam, even less of assessing his role in its revival and renewal (*tajdīd*). In fact, there has been little understanding of the concept of *tajdīd* in Islam.

This volume consists of selections from various writings of Ibn Taymīyyah included in the *Majmū' Fatāwā Shaykh al-Islām* (37 volumes) published in Riyadh, *Jāmi' ar-Rasā'il* (2 volumes), published by Dr. Rashād Salīm in Cairo, as well as some of his major works, such as *Minhāj as-Sunnah an-Nabawīyyah, Dar' Ta'āruḍ al-'Aql wa An-Naql, Kitāb ar-Radd 'alā al-Mantaqiyyīn, Al-Istiqāmah,* and *Iqtiḍā aṣ-Ṣirāṭ al-Mustaqīm.*

These selections will, I hope, present in a single volume a clear and complete view of Ibn Taymīyyah's concepts of Islamic faith, life and society. They are primarily intended to highlight his positive position and mention his criticisms and refutations of other positions only to the extent needed. I hope that, in going through these selections, the reader will also form an idea of the work of *tajdīd* that Ibn Taymīyyah undertook. In the Introduction to this volume I have discussed at length the notion of *tajdīd* in Islam and underscored the contribution of Ibn Taymīyyah in this regard. This will, I hope, help the reader understand the tremendous impact that his writings have exercised on all the efforts that are being made to revive and reinvigorate Islam in our times.

The idea to compile a selection of Ibn Taymīyyah's vast corpus of writings, presenting in his own words his basic religious thought, was presented to me a few years ago to the then Director of the Research Center of Imām Ibn Sa'ūd Islamic University, Riyadh, Dr. Muḥammad Ar-Rubay'. He very much welcomed the idea and got the approval of the president of the University, His Excellency, Dr. 'Abdullah 'Abdul-Muḥsin At-Turkī. The

completion of this work was interrupted, due to engagement in another, no-less-important project, the translation into English of Ibn Abī Al-'Izz's voluminous *Commentary on the Creed of Aṭ-Ṭaḥāwī*. After finishing that project, I returned to Ibn Taymīyyah. The present Director of the Center and Dean of Academic Research, Dr.Abdullah Al-Rabi ee, has consistently followed the progress of this work with great interest. Thank God it is now completed. Let me pray that this volume succeed in bringing Ibn Taymīyyah closer to the English-speaking world, as well as in promoting a better understanding of the pure, pristine Islam which he tried to expound in his writings.

Muḥammad 'Abdul-Ḥaqq Anṣārī

## INTRODUCTION

The Prophet, peace and blessings of God be on him, has said: "God will raise, at the head of each century, such people for this *ummah* as will renew (*ujaddidu*) its religion for it."[1] This means that the history of Islam will not be smooth sailing; the forces of ignorance (*jāhilīyyah*) will continue to be at war with Islam. As a result, some far-reaching changes will occur over a century which will disfigure Islam and seriously endanger the faith and life of the *ummah*. When this happens God will raise from the community someone or some men who will fight the *jāhilīyyah,* right the wrong which it has caused, restore Islam to its own shape, and give the community a new lease on life.

The changes and distortions which the *ḥadīth* implies will not be something petty and superficial, happening only in a decade or two and affecting only a part of the *ummah* or some people in one geographical area, such that they could be rectified by small reformative efforts. They will be profound and far-reaching, colossal and widespread, and will require a Herculean effort to rectify them. They will affect the very basis of Islam, erode or compromise the validity of the revelation, subject it to reason or intuition. They may even do the opposite: negate or undermine reason or intuition and destroy the balance which Islam maintains between them. They will affect the faith of Islam. They will change the concept of God and His relation to the world, they will distort the idea of His *tawḥīd* and its meaning for human life, and compromise it in various ways, overt and covert, and smear it with *shirk*. They will change the view of prophethood and prophetic mission, the view of the life hereafter and its relation to the life in this world. They will also affect the Islamic system of values,

replace the ultimate good of the Qur'ān and the Sunnah with some other good, alter the order of priorities, make the lower higher and the higher lower, or just drop or ignore certain values and replace them with others which are alien to Islam. They will change the manner and the method which the Qur'ān and the Sunnah prescribe to affirm, strengthen and cultivate Islamic values and accomplish Islamic perfection, and replace partly or mostly the prophetic *sulūk* with a *sulūk* which draws upon foreign sources and is geared to different ends. They will affect Islamic society, weaken the bond of unity which binds it together, make it forget the mission which God has set before it, and replace it with another not approved by Him, shift power and authority from hands which are supposed to wield it to hands which are not supposed to wield it, alter the principles which are stipulated to integrate the Islamic society, and institute in their place those that are opposed to the faith and the values of Islam.

The *mujaddid* whom God raises to revive Islam is gifted with great talents. He perceives minutely all the changes which occur in the life of the *ummah*. He gauges the extent to which they have sapped its strength. He brings those changes to the knowledge of the people. He makes them aware of all the forms they appear in. And finally, he points out the factors which have caused them. He attacks those factors, assails the doctrines which are involved, exposes the methods by which they work, traces the process through which they have developed, demolishes the excuses which people have advanced, and destroys the justifications they have offered. He rejects all the compromises which have been made with respect to God's unity, and puts in the language of the time the pure undiluted concept of *tawḥīd*.

He restates the mission and the way of the Prophet and restores his authority. He elaborates the Islamic system of values, puts

every element in its place, and defines their priorities. He demonstrates that Islam is the only religion which corresponds to the nature in which God has created man. He states the *ṭarīqah* which the Prophet taught his companions to serve God and perfect themselves, reviews the *ṭarīqah* which people have worked out by themselves and shows what is right and what is wrong in them. He defines the structure of Islamic society, the principles of its organization, the place men and women occupy in it, the rights which individuals have and the duties they are to fulfill, the hands which should wield power, the way they should exercise it, and the ends they should achieve thereby. He addresses himself to the new issues and problems which the society of his time faces, and, using the insight God has given him in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, he tries to solve them without ignoring either the tradition of the community or the demands of the new conditions.

This is the work that a *mujaddid* does on the plane of ideas. On the practical plane, he strives to correct the practices which *jāhiīyyah* has introduced, and revives the ones which it has suppressed. He fights *shirk*, misguided innovations, and unlawful practices, and promotes true faith and real piety. He wages war against the forces that support unbelief, injustice and sin, and strengthens those that work for truth, justice and virtue. He tries to ensure that power is exercised not to secure personal, group, or class interests, but to establish the rule of the *shar'* and promote the good of each and every human being. He also stands up against the external forces which try to subdue the *ummah*, or check the fulfillment of its mission. In short, he strives to establish the religion of Islam and the rule of God in all its aspects. The *mujaddid* is the heir (*warīth*)[2] of the Prophet. He tries to do the job of a prophet though he is not a prophet.

This is the work which a *mujaddid* whom God raises to renew His religion is supposed to do. But what part of it he really succeeds in doing depends upon the powers he has and the conditions he works in. He may succeed in some areas and fail in others. He may also make mistakes and, as he is not a prophet, his mistakes need not be rectified by God. This means that in reviewing the work of a *mujaddid* one need not justify each and every idea which he has expounded, or commend every work which he has done. It should also be borne in mind that the *ḥadīth* which we quoted earlier does not mean that there is only one person at a time who deserves the title of *mujaddid*. God may raise more than one person at a time who strives to renew His religion. In fact, He has sent more than one prophet at a time to save some people.

Shaykh al-Islām Taqī ad-Dīn Ibn Taymīyyah was one of those great men whom God raised to renew Islam. He occupies a place of honor among them. To call him an eminent Ḥanbalī jurist and theologian, or an outstanding Salafī scholar, or a great Sunnī reformer does not do his achievements justice. He was the *mujaddid* of Islam *par excellence*. In the following pages I will try to highlight some facets of the renovatory work which he undertook and successfully accomplished. I must confine myself to those facets which lie within the purview of this book, and I must leave out some non-related facets; I mean those which belong to the field of *fiqh*, or relate to Shī'ism and Christianity.

Ibn Taymīyyah (661/1263-728/1328) was born in Harran, in northern Iraq, near present day Mosul, to a family known for its learning. His grandfather, Majd ad-Dīn Ibn Taymīyyah (d. 653/1255), the author of *Muntaqā al-Akhbār*, a renowned compilation of legal *ḥadīth* and tradition, was the most outstanding

Ḥanbalī jurist of his time. His father, 'Abdul-Ḥalīm Ibn Taymīyyah (d. 682/1284) was a distinguished scholar of *ḥadīth*. When Taqī ad-Dīn Ibn Taymīyyah was seven, the family had to leave for Damascus, as the Mongols, who had overrun Baghdad five years earlier, were threatening to move north. In Damascus, his father was offered the post of professor of *ḥadīth* at the Sakkarīyyah Madrasah where he gave lectures on *ḥadīth* and Ḥanbalī *fiqh* till the end of his life.

Ibn Taymīyyah studied with his father and with many famous scholars of his time. On the death of his father, Ibn Taymīyyah, who was twenty-one at the time, was called to teach *ḥadīth* at Sakkarīyyah. He was also asked to give lectures on the Qur'ān at the Umayyad mosque. The rest of his time Ibn Taymīyyah devoted to the study of various branches of knowledge known in his age. Az-Zamalakānī, a contemporary scholar not favorably disposed to Ibn Taymīyyah, said - and his saying so is fully borne out by Ibn Taymīyyah's writings - that whatever subject he discussed, he surpassed all the scholars of his times in that subject.[3] In Arabic grammar, for example, he had acquired such proficiency that Abū Ḥayyān, the leading grammarian of the time, paid a visit to him and wrote an ode in his praise. As for *ḥadīth*, it was a popular saying that the *ḥadīth* which Ibn Taymīyyah did not know was not a *ḥadīth*. In *fiqh*, Ibn Taymīyyah rose to the status of a *mujtahid muṭlaq*, one who does not limit himself to any particular school but goes directly to the basic sources of the Sharī'ah to form his opinion.

By the time Ibn Taymīyyah appeared on the scene, most of the major developments in philosophy, *kalām* and *taṣawwūf* had taken place. To speak of philosophy first, thanks to the efforts of a number of thinkers, there had emerged a version of philosophy

which was in its essence neo-Platonic, but which they had projected, after some modifications, as Islamic philosophy, or at least not opposed to the Islamic faith. They had conceived of God as a self-existing necessary being, reflecting on Himself and on universal realities which were part of His essence. The world of particular things they had not considered to be worthy of His knowledge or His will. In fact, they had conceived of God's unity in a way which did not admit of any will or action on His part. They had reduced His authority either to negative epithets or to mere relations. The world, they believed, proceeded from Him of necessity through a series of beings in an ontologically regressive order from intelligences, spheres of material objects. It was an eternal, self-operating system of causes and effects supervised by the Active Intellect.

Man was a combination of matter and spirit, and his perfection lay in the subordination of his body to his reason, in reflection and action. His ultimate perfection, however, lay only in pure rational activity, in contemplation alone. In this way, man could imitate God, which is his ultimate happiness. After death, the material body would perish forever. Most of the philosophers believed that there would be no resurrection of the body. Paradise would be the abode of the spirit, and its inhabitants would be such as had perfected their reason and transformed it from potentiality into actuality.

In principle, human reason is competent to know God and all other realities, as it is competent to know good and evil. Revelation is needed for the common people, whose reason is overwhelmed by passions. It is for them that prophets are sent, and it is in their language that they speak, a language of parables and metaphors. When interpreted properly and put into non-figurative language, their ideas will never differ from those which the philosophers

discover through reason. For truth is one, whether taught by Plato and Aristotle, or by Moses and Muḥammad. Besides an extraordinary power of knowing truths, the prophets were given unusually strong imaginations which projected rational ideas in material forms, as well as the power to work wonders. However, those powers are also available to non-prophets to some degree.

Before Ibn Taymīyyah, Al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) had examined many of these ideas in his *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* and subjected them to searching criticism. He had tried to show that some of these doctrines were simply false, and others that were true the philosophers were not able to prove conclusively. Reason, he had shown, was not competent to reach the truth on theological issues. On three of their doctrines, namely that particular things are not the object of God's knowledge, that the world is eternal, and that resurrection would only be of the spirit, he had charged the philosophers with unbelief (*kufr*).

Extensive as it was, Al-Ghazālī's criticism did not cover many other parts of philosophy. He did not touch upon logic or ethics. On the contrary, he hailed logic as the epitome of all knowledge and made it part of the Islamic curriculum without realizing its epistemological and metaphysical implications. He also adopted the philosophers' view of human perfection and happiness. In his later writings, the authenticity of some of which is disputed, he reiterated some philosophical doctrines and revised some of his own earlier views. Reviewing Al-Ghazālī's criticism of philosophy, Ibn Rushd (d. 598/1201) partly agreed with his criticisms and admitted that cosmological or etiological arguments developed by Aristotle, or the argument from contingency advanced by Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1036) for God's existence were not convincing. On the other hand, with respect to the argument from design or creation of man which the Qur'ān states, he attacked the

theologians' doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*, and said that it could not be supported by the Qur'ān. He also pointed out that the whole emanationist doctrine which Al-Ghazālī had criticized was not Aristotelian; it was only put forward by Farabī (d. 329/950) and by Ibn Sīnā. He found fault with other doctrines of Ibn Sīnā, and showed that Al-Ghazālī was not correct to attribute them to Aristotle.[4]

These developments, as well as the ideas which Ibn Sīnā in his later writings and Shihāb ad-Dīn Suhrawardī Al-Maqtul (d. 587/1991) in his philosophy of illumination (*ishrāq*) had expounded, demanded a more thorough criticism of philosophy and a better statement of Islamic concepts.

While philosophers were committed above all else to reason, or what they thought to be rational, the theologians (*mutakalimūn*) were supposed to be loyal first to revelation, but they paid little attention to it. They believed that the Qur'ān only stated the creed. As for arguments, it did not say much or, if it said anything, it was rhetorical. They underestimated Qur'ānic arguments regarding credal issues. On the other hand, they overestimated the efficacy of reason in theology and did not realize it limitations. They could not see that many of their arguments were inconclusive and unconvincing. Moreover, they had borrowed concepts from philosophy or had developed them by themselves, which led them to interpret the words of the Qur'ān in a metaphorical way, as opposed to how the Elders of Islam understood the Qur'ān. They even negated many attributes of God or rendered them inoperative. The Mu'tazilah, for example, represented the attributes of God as accidents (*a'rad*) that exist in a body, and on that account denied speech to God and asserted that the Qur'ān was something created. Similarly, on the grounds that vision can only be the vision of a

body in space, they denied that the believers would see God in the Hereafter.

On the other hand, the Asha'irah, the dominant schools of theology at the time, reacting to the Mu'tazilī view regarding the rationality of good and evil in the impression that it implied an obligation on God and limited His absolute power, denied that there was anything good or bad in itself or that its goodness or badness could be known through reason, independently of revelation. This lead them to deny God's wisdom and render His will completely arbitrary. They also did not realize that their doctrine left no grounds for morality and religion in man, and robbed them of all justification. It left man with nothing with which to judge a prophet's claim to prophethood or to distinguish between a true prophet and an imposter. Their idea of an absolute, divine will led them to deny efficacy to human will, as well as causality in nature. They asserted that man was not the doer of his acts; he only acquired them. There is only one doer or actor there: God. Besides contradicting many statements of the Qur'ān, as well as the universal judgment of mankind, this doctrine paved the way for the much more damaging doctrine of the unity of being (*waḥdat al-wujūd*). From the oneness of the actor, Ṣūfīs and philosophers had only to take a small step to reach the oneness of being.

On the popular level, the Ash'arī doctrine regarding the *ṣifat khabarīyyah* caused greater alarm, and was regarded as being influenced by *I'tizāl*. They denied reality to these attributes and treated them as metaphors. They said that the face (*wajh*) of God means His being, His hand means power or favor, His *istawā* on the Throne means His rule, and His descending (*nuzūl*) to the lowest heaven means His blessing.

A considerable section of the people, led by scholars of *ḥadīth* and some Ḥanbalīs, reacted to this and other doctrines very strongly. They condemned theology as such, failing to distinguish between right *kalām* and wrong *kalām*. They would not admit that it had ever served any good purpose. They took the *ṣifat khabarīyyah* as literally true, completely anthropomorphized God and ascribed all the parts of the human body to Him. They thus smeared the good name of the Salaf, who had rightly abstained from such action. Among them, however, there were scholars like Ibn Al-Jawzī (d. 597/1200) who condemned this extreme reactionary trend and pleaded for a more moderate view.

Like philosophy and *kalām*, *taṣawwūf* had stretched a long distance and had reached its climax before Ibn Taymīyyah. In its first phase, during the second century Hijrī, it was only a way of self-purification (*tazkiyat an-nafs*). Ṣūfīs like Ibrāhīm Ibn Adham (d. 160/776) and Fuḍayl Ibn 'Iyāḍ (d. 187/803) lived ascetic lives and devoted themselves to worship and *dhikr*. Their successors in the third century, like Abū Yazīd (d. 261/875), Junayd (d. 298/910), and others, developed definite *ṭarīqah* of their own to reach God, which consisted of stages and stations and culminated in the experience of God which they called *fanā'*, self-effacement, and *jam'*, union with God. They developed a whole terminology to describe various experiences through which the Ṣūfī passes on the path, which As-Sarrāj (d. 378/988) and Al-Qushayrī (d. 485/1072) have discussed in their works. Reflections on the way and the experience in this phase of Ṣūfīsm was in its early stages, as we find in the statements of Al-Junayd on *tawḥīd*, or in the description of Abū Yazīd of his own experience.

The third and final phase of *taṣawwūf* was marked by philosophical speculation in the light of mystical experience, as we

find in the doctrine of *ḥulūl*, in-dwelling of God in man, at the hand of Al-Ḥallāj (309/923), or of *waḥdat al-wujūd*, Unity of Being at the hand of Ibn 'Arabī (d. 638/1240). Between Ibn 'Arabī, who had also taken Damascus as his seat, and Ibn Taymīyyah, there was a gap of less than a century, but in that short span, the former's doctrine had spread throughout the Islamic world, and different versions of it had been brought out by Ṣūfīs like Al-Qūnawī (d. 672/1273), Ibn Sab'īn (d. 668/1269, At-Tilimsānī (d. 690/1291) and others. Earlier in the fifth century, Al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), who had also developed a mystical philosophy in some sense similar to that of Ibn 'Arabī in his *Mishkāt al-Anwār* and in a disguised form in some parts of his *Ihyā al-'Ulūm* and other writings, to some that also interpreted religious concepts like *tawḥīd*, trust (*tawakkul*), patience (*ṣabr*), and love (*maḥabbah*) on Ṣūfī lines. He strongly advocated the Ṣūfī *ṭarīqah*, and underlined the need for Ṣūfī *kashf* as a means to comprehend ultimate realities and interpret theological truths.

These developments in *taṣawwūf* posed great problems for a *mujaddid*. He had first to define the place of *kashf* in theology and religion vis-à-vis revelation and reason. Second, he had to review the whole gamut of theosophical doctrines which Ṣūfīsm had put forward and show what parts of this were right and what were wrong. Third, he had to examine the *Sulūk* which the Ṣūfīs were advocating and point out what part of it was consistent with the Qur'ān and Sunnah. Fourth, he had to scrutinize the values of life which Ṣūfīsm had developed and the interpretation of moral and religious virtues which it had offered and show what part of it was acceptable and what was not.

This rapid survey of philosophy, theology and Ṣūfīsm will show what tasks Ibn Taymīyyah had before him. Let us see how he accomplished them.

It is time now to state the bases of Ibn Taymīyyah's approach to the renovation of Islam. First, he maintains that the Qur'ān and the Sunnah are not only the sources of Islamic law; they are also the sources of Islamic faith and belief. They tell how life is to be conducted, how society is to be organized, how economy is to be managed, and how government is to be administered. They further show the way (*ṭarīqah*) Muslims should purify themselves, cultivate piety and serve God best. The basic principles of all these areas have been laid down in the Qur'ān. They have been explained and elaborated further by the Sunnah of the Prophet. Hence, in all these matters one must look to them first; everything else comes next and can only be acceptable if it is consistent with them.

The correct procedure for understanding a Qur'ānic statement is first to refer to other relevant verses of the Qur'ān, for one part of the Qur'ān explains another. Then one should refer to the Sunnah of the Prophet, which is the authoritative explanation of the Qur'ān and should never diverge from it provided its authenticity is established. Third, one should look to the words and the practices of the Companions. In their understanding of the Qur'ān, and in their views on major issues of faith, values and conduct of life they had few differences; their words and practices have a normative value. Last, the comments of their successors (*at-tabi'ūn*) on the Qur'ān are also to be taken note of: one should not diverge from agreed-upon views; and where they differ one should adopt that which is closest to the Qur'ān and Sunnah. In their practice, too, the Successors were closest to the ideal of the Qur'ān

and Sunnah, and were little affected by foreign ideas, values and traditions.

Besides these two generations, Ibn Taymīyyah also refers to the views of the *a'immah* of Islam, whose knowledge and piety the *ummah* trusts. Among them he counts the four imāms, Abū Ḥanīfah (d. 150/667), Mālik (d. 179/795), Ash-Shāfi'ī (d. 204/819) and, above all, Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbāl (d. 241/855), then the scholars of distinction within their schools, as well as independent thinkers like Al-Awzā'ī (d. 157/774) and Sufyān Ath-Thawrī (d. 160?771), leading critics and scholars of *ḥadīth* - such as Al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870), Muslim (d. 261/875), and the rest of the great compilers of *ḥadīth* - occupy a place of honor on this list. All the people that we have so far mentioned are referred to by Ibn Taymīyyah as the Righteous Elders. Their understanding of the Qur'ān and Sunnah, as well as their interpretation of Islamic faith and values, he holds, must be honored and followed. The language of the Arabs does have a role in the understanding and interpretation of the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, but it only comes after them. Moreover, the language that matters is what was used before Islam or in its early period when the language was not affected by new usage.

Reason is the next principle of Ibn Taymīyyah's innovative work. He says that God created man with a particular nature, *fiṭrah*. The beliefs, values and the principles of Islamic life and society have their roots in this *fiṭrah*. Islam is the religion of *fiṭrah*. and the whole purpose of Islam is the perfection of man on the lines of his *fiṭrah*. Reason is part of *fiṭrah*. Here there is and must be complete agreement between reason and revelation. This places two obligations on Ibn Taymīyyah. He has to show, on the one hand, that the beliefs, values and the principles of life and society that the Qur'ān, the Sunnah and the *Salaf* expound have their

rational justification; they are neither irrational nor arbitrary. He has to show, on the other hand, that whatever philosophers, theologians, or scholars of any field claim to be rational is not in reality rational if it goes against the Qur'ān, Sunnah and the views of the *Salaf.*

In addition to these principles, Ibn Taymīyyah also affirms a source of knowledge which may be called intuition. Commenting on the claim of Al-Ghazālī that piety is often the cause of an extraordinary knowledge which God imparts directly to the heart, Ibn Taymīyyah expresses his complete agreement and cites in support verse 8:29 and the *ḥadīth* which counts 'Umar among those who receive inspiration *muḥaddathūn.*[5] But how this principle stands with respect to what Ṣūfīs call *kashf* or *mukāshafah* he does not discuss. He does, however, very seriously limit the efficacy of this principle, and completely subjects it to revelation, just as he does in case of reason.

There are two main sources of knowledge: one that is available to every human being in varying degrees - senses and reason; and the other which is for prophets and messengers - revelation. In the former category there is a part which is self-evident, such as two and two make four, or two things which are equal to a third thing are equal to each other. Mathematics is based on these axiomatic truths that need no argument to prove them. Another category of knowledge is what is gained through sense perception and experience. This knowledge is of particular things which exist in reality - this man or that man, this chair or that chair. There is no knowledge of man as such, or of chair as such, for universals, Ibn Taymīyyah says, have no existence in reality; they exist only in our minds. And there is no knowledge of things which do not exist out there. Like the Stoics before him, Ibn Taymīyyah is a

thoroughgoing nominalist; he opposes every doctrine which imputes any real existence to universals. All scientific knowledge, he says, proceeds from the perception of particular things from which reason forms ideas and concepts. This is the case for all physical and social sciences.

Logic, as a science dealing with the rules of correct reasoning, is not in itself opposed by Ibn Taymīyyah. His criticism of logic is directed against its formulation by Aristotle and against the efforts by Al-Ghazālī and others to make Aristotelian logic the major source of all correct knowledge. However, his criticism often degenerates into a denunciation of logic as a worthless science. In this he displays the influence of the earlier denouncers of logic, like Ibn Aṣ-Ṣalāh (d. 643/1245).

Nevertheless, there are many constructive aspects of significant importance in his review of logic. The first concerns the theory of definition. For Aristotle, the way to know the essence of a thing, what it really is, is to find out what genus it belongs to and what differentiates it from the rest of the members of that genus. A definition which comprises the genus and the differentia of a thing gives the essence of a thing. Ibn Taymīyyah argues in detail that defining a thing by pointing out its genus and differentia is not the proper way, let alone the best way. The proper and the best way to teach someone what a thing is is either to show him the thing itself, point out to him something similar to it, or describe to him its various qualities and properties. These are the ways by which we know things' common life, and not by definition as Aristotle suggests. To appreciate the value of Ibn Taymīyyah's criticism of Aristotelian definition it is enough to point out that the standard method which modern science has adopted in its quest for knowledge is the one which Ibn Taymīyyah suggests.

His second concerns syllogistic reasoning, which comprises a major and a minor premise and a conclusion which follows from them. He show that the truth of a major premise (All As are Bs) is derived from the observation of individual cases of As and Bs. Since it is not possible to observe all the cases, the truth of the major premise is based on reasoning from analogy. It is strange, therefore, that syllogistic reasoning is said to produce certain knowledge, while analogy, on which it is based, is regarded as generating only possibility. Further, in syllogistic reasoning one moves from the general to the particular, whereas knowledge of things which exist must proceed from the particular, for only individual things exist in reality, not universals.

Last, with respect to God, syllogistic reasoning is absolutely not applicable, for God is not a member of a genus; He is one and unique in His existence as well as attributes. It follows that the logic which philosophers make use of in theology is not applicable there, and the ideas which they thereby come upon, contrary to their claim that they are true and certain, are no more than mere conjectures. The correct kind of reasoning in theological matters, Ibn Taymīyyah says, is not syllogistic, but reasoning by priority (*qiyās al-awlā*). He defines this concept in this way: Every perfection which we think of in the case of created beings, and which is free from all defects, is to be affirmed for the Creator first and foremost; similar, every imperfection which we think of in the case of created beings is to be negated of the Creator prior to anyone else.[6]

Besides the basic law of logic, there are certain ethical ideas which are also part of man's original make up (*fiṭrah*). The Qur'ān says that God has endowed every human soul with the knowledge of good and evil, as well as with the sense of responsibility that one should do good and avoid evil. These ideas are not simply

conventional ideas (*mashhūrāt*) whose validity is limited to the society in which they are prevalent, as philosophers think. They are part of man's *fiṭrah* and are universally true. We know of their truth prior to any revelation; in fact, they form part of the criterion on which the truth of revelation is judged.

Ibn Taymīyyah sides here with the Mu'tazilah and the Māturīdīyyah, and opposes the Asha'irah, who make the knowledge of good and evil completely independent of revelation. He says that things that are good or bad are of three kinds. First is those things which are known to be good or bad prior to their pronouncement by revelation, such as justice and truthfulness. We know the goodness of these things through reason; revelation only confirms that knowledge. Second is things that *become* good or bad after revelation has commanded or forbidden them. Third is things that God commands in order to see whether people will submit to or defy His commandments. Things that are thus commanded not to be done at all *become* good like those in the second category. An example of this kind is the command of God to Abraham to sacrifice his son. When Abraham submitted to God's command and proceeded to carry it out, the purpose of the command was served and Abraham was stopped from proceeding further, and was given a lamb to sacrifice instead. The Mu'tazilah failed to see this kind of good as well as the preceding category; they only saw the first category of good. The Asha'irah, on the other hand, thought every good to belong to the third category and negated the others.

Ibn Taymīyyah separates the question of knowledge of the good and the bad from the question of recompense in the Hereafter. Those who commit evil will not necessarily be punished by God in the Hereafter as the Mu'tazilah believe, unless God

sends, Ibn Taymīyyah says, His messengers to warn them against evil deeds. He quotes many verses and the *ḥadīth* on the point.

Ibn Taymīyyah is not opposed to theology (*kalām*) as such. He distinguishes between right and wrong theology. He even recognizes that theologians like the Mu'tazilah have done service to the faith, have defended against the onslaught of other faiths and won a number of people from among them to the fold of Islam.[7] His criticism of *kalām* can be summed up in three points. First, the theologians attend only to the statements of the Qur'ān and Sunnah on credal issues, and ignore or do not pay sufficient attention to the arguments which the Qur'ān advances. Two, the arguments which they themselves advance, though they do not realize it, are not convincing. They have too much faith in the efficacy of reason, and give it priority over revelation or its understanding by the *Salaf*. They are not aware of the limitations of reason in theology. Third, some of the premises on which they build their arguments are either taken from other sources or just put forth in reaction to their opponents without critical examination of their validity. These premises often lead them to wrong consequences, such as denying a text or interpreting it wrongly and making it inoperative. They even lead them to deny some common-sense ideas which are accepted by all. Ibn Taymīyyah's effort was to work out a theology that is free from these shortcomings, is more faithful to the text of the Qur'ān and the Sunnah as understood by the *Salaf*, and is more rational and convincing.

About philosophy, Ibn Taymīyyah's attitude is completely different; it is a thoroughly critical and completely negative attitude. He may agree with one or another minor philosophical idea, but he does not see any possibility for an Islamic philosophy. He does not discuss it as an issue, but this is the impression that

one gets from his criticism of philosophy and from the fact that he does not try to work out any philosophy, as he does in case of theology.

We have observed that Ibn Taymīyyah recognizes a third principle besides revelation and reason, and although he does not go into details as to how it stands with what the Ṣūfīs call *kashf* and mystical experience, he limits its efficacy and subjects it to the prophetic revelation. Ibn Taymīyyah's criticism of Ṣūfism is first in the area of doctrine, such as the doctrines of *ḥulūl*, in-dwelling of God in man, and *waḥdat al-wujūd*. In particular, he discusses the latter at length, refutes the premises on which it is based, and points out all its implications to Islamic faith and values. He reviews next the *ṭarīqah* which the Ṣūfīs developed and denounces the unauthorized innovations which they introduced in the forms of worship and remembrance of God (*dhikr*), and points out the effects which they exercise on Islamic life. It may be noted that he does not denounce the experience of *fanā* as such, which distinguishes the way of the Ṣūfī from the way of a simple ascetic (*zāhid*) and devotee (*'ābid*).[8] He also examines the ascetic and mystical orientation which Ṣūfīs have given to virtues such as abstention, love, trust, sincerity and resignation, and points out what part of it is right and what is wrong. He himself explains and elaborates them in the light of the Qur'ān, *ḥadīth* and the practices of the *Salaf*.

On credal issues, neither reason nor mystical intuition can provide certain knowledge. The only correct source is the *waḥī* of the Prophet. A part of the prophetic *waḥī* is literally the word of God Himself, which the angel conveyed to the Prophet and is preserved in the form of the Qur'ān. Another part is an idea which God put in the Prophet's mind and which the Prophet articulated

and put as the word of God. A third part is what the Prophet said under the guidance and supervision of God. Its truth is guaranteed by God; and if on any occasion any mistake creeps in, it is immediately corrected by God. Reports on the actions of the Prophet, if they are correct and have come down to us through reliable channels, are also treated as part of revelation. His actions are supervised and their correctness is guaranteed by God in the same way as his words.

Reports of the Prophet's words or the reports on his life and actions, which are called *ḥadīth* or Sunnah, are the sources of faith, values and laws. Their statements regarding things unseen provide certain knowledge regarding them, and their prescriptions lay down certain rules to guide human life and action and are imperative. These rules are either obligatory and must be carried out, or commendatory and should be followed.

Some of the *aḥādīth* report the exact words of the Prophet, some only convey their ideas, and some report very faithfully the actions of the Prophet. If these *aḥādīth* are transmitted by a number of transmitters, honest and true and with reliable memories, they are called *mutawātir*; they provide certain knowledge for belief as well as action. The *aḥādīth* which are called *khabar āḥād*, reported by one or more transmitters, fewer than those required for a *mutawātir ḥadīth*, are also to be believed and acted upon, provided the transmitters are honest and of reliable memory. These *aḥādīth* are called *ṣaḥīḥ*. The best compilation of *ṣaḥīḥ aḥādīth* is that of Al-Bukhārī and then of Muslim. *Ṣaḥīḥ aḥādīth* and to a lesser degree the *ḥasan*, or the fairly good *aḥādīth*, may also be used as arguments in matters of faith. But the *aḥādīth* which are weak (*ḍa'īf*) must be avoided. Ibn Taymīyyah goes into the rational justification of this position in different writings.

The creed which Ibn Taymīyyah presents is well grounded in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, has the support of the majority of the Elders, is more reasonable and convincing, avoids the pitfalls into which the theologians, philosophers and Ṣūfīs had landed themselves, and is put in terms comprehensible to all.

Take, for example, the existence of God. The argument which the theologians had advanced for God's existence runs like this: The world consists of bodies, which are made of atomic substances (*jawāhir fardah*) and incidents (*a'rad*). Since no substance exists without incidents, and since incidents are contingents, and since whatever is infected by incidents is contingent, the world is contingent. And whatever is contingent needs a non-contingent cause to bring it into existence, and that cause can only be God. These various premises which make up the argument are obviously not self-evident; they have to be established. Ibn Taymīyyah examines them at length and shows how they lack certainty and how the argument as a whole is far from being conclusive.[9] He also points out the consequences which follow from these premises and which conflict with the Qur'ān and Sunnah and go against common sense.

The arguments which the philosophers had advanced did not fare any better. One of the arguments which was put forward by Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā begins by distinguishing between necessary and possible existence. The underlying assumption is that the possible has an essence different from its existence, and that the essence is at one time qualified with existence and at another time with non-existence (*'adam*). But this very possibility needs to be established. Ibn Taymīyyah argues that it is far from the truth; essence is always one with existence, as the philosophers admit in the case of God.[10] Their third argument, which Aristotle and Ibn

Miskawayh (d. 421/1030) advanced and which is based on the idea of movement, is also not convincing, as Ibn Sīnā had said.[11]

The Qur'ān, Ibn Taymīyyah says, starts with the idea that the belief that the world is created is a part of the natural endowment (*fiṭrah*) of man. This is corroborated by the fact that there has been no community on the earth which has not believed in a Creator. As further support, the Qur'ān argues for the creation of man from dust, then from sperm, then from congealed blood, then from a lump out of which bones are formed which are next clothed with flesh (23:12-14). This argument is perfectly rational and convincing. Everyone knows that he is not self-born, that he is created, that at one time he did not exist and then came into existence, that his body is made of material that comes from earth, that he is produced from sperm and then from congealed blood, and then from a lump from which the bones are formed which are then clothed with flesh. Each part of this argument is open to perception and is well established. The strength of this argument is admitted by Ibn Rushd, the famous commentator on Aristotle. He hails it as the most natural argument which the prophets offer for the existence of God.[12]

As for the attributes of God, the philosophers started with the Greek idea that God must be absolutely one, simple and non-composite, that he has to be above all distinctions, mental and real. As a consequence, they interpreted His attributes negatively or reduced them to relations. All His names, they believed, only refer to His essence, of which either something is negated or of which some relation is asserted. Al-Ghazālī had examined this idea earlier and refuted it in his *Tahāfut*. Ibn Taymīyyah carries the criticism further. His point is that the existence of positive attributes like knowledge are not other than He: they are one with Him. Hence it is not right to say that God is dependent upon something other than

Himself. Further, a being devoid of all attributes is simply a mental abstraction, a void, a non-entity.

For the Mu'tazilah, the reason for denying the existence of attributes was different. They thought that it either implied plurality of eternal beings if the attributes are taken as eternal, or the existence of contingent things in God if they are taken as contingent, which would render God contingent. To avoid these circumstances, they reduced either the attributes to mere relations (e.g. knowledge as the relation of the Divine Essence with the object known), or the states of the Divine Essence like knowing (*al-'alimīyyah*), which were said to be neither existing nor non-existing. Ibn Taymīyyah refutes this argument by saying that to affirm the existence of attributes is not to posit in any sense the existence of independent entities other than God. Neither is it the hypostasization of attributes on Christian lines, which the Mu'tazilah wanted to avoid.

The Ash'arīs, Ibn Taymīyyah recognizes, developed a better concept of God's attributes. They affirmed of Him seven essential attributes: knowledge, power, will, life, hearing, sight and speech. They said that these attributes are not the same as the Divine Essence, for they have existence over and above the Essence, not reducible to mere relations or states. Nor are they different from the Essence, as they do not exist separately from the Essence, neither by themselves nor by anything other than the Essence. God is one single Being, one Essence qualified with attributes. We can only distinguish between Essence and the attributes in thought, not in reality. Out there there is no pure Essence devoid of all attributes, nor is there any attribute existing there by itself.

The Asha'irah, however, conceived of each one of these seven attributes of God as a single eternal attribute working independently of His will for fear that it would make them

contingent. They said, for example, that God knows everything past, present and future with one eternal will, and speaks every word with one eternal speech; for they thought that the alternative was to posit a plurality of contingent knowledges, wills, and speeches which would render the Divine Essence the locus of contingent things and jeopardize its eternity. Ibn Taymīyyah concedes that this is true only of God's life and existence, but not of His will, speech and other attributes, since that would imply the eternity of their objects, willed, spoken, seen, etc. Obviously, the subject of God's will, for example, which is all powerful, cannot be conceived to lag behind His will. It is also obvious that one will is not another will, and knowledge of one thing is not knowledge of another thing; even knowledge of the same thing before its existence is not same as knowledge after its coming into existence.

Ibn Taymīyyah says that the correct solution to this problem is to distinguish between an eternal will and contingent wills, between eternal knowledge and contingent knowledges, between eternal speech and contingent speeches. God's will as a class is one and eternal, but His individual knowledges are multiple and contingent; His speech as a class is one and eternal, but His individual speech acts are multiple and contingent, for all individual wills, knowledges, and speeches depend on one eternal will, and what depends on will is contingent. This solution to the problem is not free from difficulty, but it is certainly more reasonable.

As philosophers conceived of God as being obviously simple and beyond all distinctions, and denied as a result His will and action, they considered the world as proceeding out from God necessarily, without any non-being intervening. It was also eternal because there was not any time before the worlds came into existence, for time is the measure of movement and there was

nothing there to move before the world came into being. Al-Ghazālī had refuted in detail in his *Taḥāfut* the argument of the philosophers for the eternity of the world; he had affirmed its contingency, and had shown that it was created by the will of God. But like the other Ash'arīs he maintained that God creates everything with His eternal will. As to the question why God should create a thing at one particular time and not at another, when every time is equal for an eternal and all-powerful will, the answer that he and other Ash'arīs gave was that an eternal, all-powerful will was sufficient in itself to create anything any time.

The Mu'tazilah, in the opposite view, posited contingent wills for God not existing in any locus.[13] They came out with the idea of a will without a locus to avoid the existence of contingent things in the Divine Essence. They also asserted that in the beginning God was not creative and only became creative afterwards. This implies, Ibn Taymīyyah says, either His inactivity for a time or His *inabī*lity, neither of which is to be attributed to Him.[14] His view on the subject is that God is and has ever been creative. His will as a class is eternal, and things of the world as a class are also eternal, but since they are the results of individual wills which are contingent, as individual things they are also contingent.

Both the philosophers and the Ash'arīs were of the view that God does not act in order to achieve anything in... His actions are not motivated by any motive nor done with any purpose. For the Asha'irah, things are produced by the eternal will of God, hence the world as it is could not have been different. For the philosophers, on the other hand, the world is the emergence of things in existence in their time according as they are in the knowledge of God from eternity. The difference between them may be stated as follows: The philosophers deny purpose because they do not attribute any will to God; they think that will implies

want, which cannot be ascribed to God. The Ash'arīs deny purpose, not because God does not have will; they do attribute will to Him, but they think that to ascribe purpose to Him means attributing imperfection to Him that He seeks to overcome by producing the thing He has in mind. They think that God's will is all-powerful and self-sufficient and needs no purpose or reason to move it.

Ibn Taymīyyah refutes the point that purpose necessarily implies want. He says that God's actions are the expressions of His knowledge and power, and He loves to exercise them, but they do have a reason and a purpose. He quotes texts from the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, which affirm reason for God's actions, and at the same time deny any want on His part, and affirm His complete self-sufficiency.

The Mu'tazilah attribute reason and purpose to God's will. They say that He has created men, and sent prophets and messengers to them with His messages and books so that they may live a good life and may be rewarded for their good deeds. Ibn Taymīyyah appreciates this point, but he says that it is not right to relate purpose to creatures alone. There are texts, he points out, which also relate purpose to God Himself. He does want people to remember Him, glorify Him, worship Him, and obey His commandments, as well as fear Him, love Him, and put trust in Him. And when they worship Him and obey Him, He is pleased with them and loves them, but this does not mean that He needs their worship, their praises, or their obedience. It also does not mean that He was incomplete without them; on the contrary, He does these things because He loves them.

One may point out that, although God sends the prophets for the good of mankind, and a number of them who believe in them and follow them benefit from this act of God, many others who do

not believe in them suffer. What wisdom (*ḥikmah*) is there in an action which causes colossal suffering besides immense good? The Mu'tazilah tried to meet this objection by saying that the prophets are sent only to those who believe in them and obey them and not for those who do not believe in them and defy them. For God does not will anything which is evil, nor does He will anything which does not happen. This answer is obviously not correct, for if God has not sent the prophets to the disbelievers and the defiers, why should He punish them for their disbelief and disobedience? It is also not true that disbelief or disobedience occur without God's will.

Ibn Taymīyyah affirms, on the contrary, that whatever good or bad happens in the world happens with God's permission, and is brought out by His will and power. He points out that God's will is of two kinds, creative and prescriptive. Sending the prophets, giving them a message and ordering them to follow it is part of His prescriptive will, which implies that what He commands is also loved by Him. However, man is free to submit to His prescriptive will. If he obeys His commands he will be rewarded; if he defies them he will be punished. And everything God commands is good and approved of and loved by Him. As for the creative will, its object may be good and may be evil, as it does not involve His approval or disapproval. All those who deny or defy the prophets are addressed by God's message and are the objects of His prescriptive will, just as those who believe in the prophets and submit to them. God wills, in this sense of will, the good of each and every human being, believer and unbeliever, obedient and sinful. But the lack of faith and the misdeeds of the former are willed and created only by His creative will. Similarly, the suffering which is the recompense of lack of faith and misdeeds is also produced by His creative will.

It may, however, happen that God wills something good which involves some evil, as He sends rain for the good of the people but which may also cause suffering to some. But in such cases the good always outweighs the evil. Similarly, the good that follows from sending the prophets also outweighs the evil which may follow from it in the form of suffering for those who reject them.

The philosophers viewed bodies as consisting of matter and form, which is the sum of all the essential properties to which a thing inheres. They believed that the form of a thing is unalterable. Fir, for example, whose property is to burn, will never cease to burn, or water, whose property is to cool, will never cease to cool. They believed that there is a necessary connection between cause and effect. On that ground they rejected miracles except in appearance. Al-Ghazālī subjected this view of causality to scathing criticism in the *Taḥāfut*. He denied that things in themselves have any fixed form, nature or property, and that one thing causes another. Everything, he said is caused directly by the will of God. What people call cause is only a condition, the only cause is the will of God.

Ibn Taymīyyah refutes bothse doctrines, the doctrine of the philosophers that things have unalterable form, and the doctrine of Al-Ghazālī and the Ash'arīs that things have no form or nature at all, and that nothing causes anything and is simply a condition for its existence. He affirms both form and causality, but only denies that form is unalterable. This makes miracles possible. The reason which he cites for affirming causality is the one which Ibn Rushd had pointed out earlier - that it would otherwise make knowledge impossible.[15]

As a consequence of their denial of will and knowledge of particular things to God, the philosophers also refused to attribute speech to Him. Instead, they attributed it to the Active Intellect,

which they identified with Gabriel. They also denied that the prophet's experience with Gabriel was an external experience. They said that prophets hear words and see figures inside themselves, not outside. On all these points, Ibn Taymīyyah shows, they go against the clear texts of the Qur'ān and Sunnah. The Mu'tazilah recognized only three attributes of God (life, knowledge and power) as real attributes, and treated the rest as relations, states or negative attributes. Therefore, they could not recognize speech as an attribute existing in the Divine Essence. They said that when God speaks, it only means that He creates speech in something other than Him.

Ibn Taymīyyah ridiculed this view, saying that this is not what we mean when we say X speaks, or X is the speaker. We say that only when words are spoken by X, or when it is X who is the speaker. We call X living or knowing or moving when X himself is alive or knows or moves, and not when he brings someone else to life, or produces knowledge in some being, or causes movement in some body; similar, we can only say that God speaks or that He is the speaker when it is He Who speaks, and not when He creates the speech in something else.

The Asha'irah recognized speech as a real and essential attribute of God. But they said, as they said in the case of His knowledge, will and power, that He speaks with His eternal speech. Since they did not distinguish between speech as a class, which is one and eternal, and individual speech acts, which are multiple and contingent, they said that God speaks with one eternal speech. It is one single speech, whether it is a command, prohibition or statement, and it is one single speech which when put in Hebrew was called Torah, when put in Syriac was called Gospel, and when put in Arabic was called Qur'ān. To justify these outrageous statements, they said that God's speech should be

understood as mental speech, without words or sounds, only as an idea or meaning.

Ibn Taymīyyah subjects this view to scathing criticism. His own view, which he says is the faith of the *Salaf*, begins with the description of speech as eternal and as contingent. He says that the speech of God as a class is eternal. God has been speaking from eternity when and as He has chosen to speak. But particular speech acts of His are not eternal. Further, as objects of His will they are contingent. However, they are not to be called created (*makhlūq*), for speech is related to the speaker in a way different from the way the sun, the moon, a lion, or a man whom God has created are related to Him. Speech exists in God, but the sun, moon, lion and man exist out there separate from God. The statement that the Qur'ān is neither eternal (*qadīm*) nor created, underscores this special relation which God's speech has with Him.

The Qur'ān is literally the word of God. Its meaning as well as its words are from God; and the Qur'ān in both essences is uncreated, though not eternal. Gabriel got it from God as such, and delivered it to the Prophet without adding anything to it or subtacting anything from it. And the Prophet likewise delivered it to his people without any change whatsoever. So the Qur'ān that we have is the word of God exactly as He spoke it to Gabriel. It was the same word of God which was written down in the *muṣḥaf* during the time of Abū Bakr and 'Uthmān, the same word of God which Muslims have been transcribing since then in their *muṣḥafs*. Similarly, the words of the Qur'ān that anyone recites and hears from any reciter are the words of God. In all these forms, the Qur'ān is the uncreated word of God. However, the ink and the paper which are used in writing, as well as the act of writing, are ours; they belong to man and are created. Similarly, the voice in

which the Qur'ān is read or recited, as well as the act of reading and reciting, are human voices and acts and are created.

Ibn Taymīyyah's general stand on divine attributes is that whatever attributes God and His Prophet have affirmed of God should be affirmed, and whatever they have negated of Him should be negated, and what they have neither affirmed nor negated should be analyzed first. Concerning the last category, if the affirmation implies something which agrees with what God and the Prophet have affirmed, it may be affirmed, otherwise not. However, regarding the names of God, only those names are to be affirmed which have been affirmed by God and the Prophet, even if the proposed name has nothing wrong with it.

Second, the attributes of God which are also predicated of His creatures are not to be compared with the attributes of the creatures. They are absolutely non-similar and unique. Creatures in no sense participate in the attributes of the Creator, just as they do not participate in His essence. There is nothing common between them except in name. Third, they should be taken on their *ẓāhir*; that is, they should be understood in the sense they ordinarily mean, or, as we say, they should be taken at face value; they should not be interpreted metaphorically. However, this does not mean that the Qur'ān does not use metaphors; it does. But whenever it does there is invariably an indication by its speaker to that effect. Hence, when, following such an indication, a word of the Qur'ān is interpreted in a non-literal or metaphorical sense, it is the *ẓāhir* of that word there.

The attributes of God which are called *aṣ-ṣifāt al-khabarīyyah*, such as *istiwā*, descent (*nuzūl*), face (*wajh*), eye (*'ayn*), hand (*yad*), shank (*sāq*) or anger (*ghaḍab*), love (*ḥubb*), pleasure (*riḍā*) smile (*ḍaḥik*), and so on, which we know only through revelation, are

also to be taken on their *ẓāhir*, that is, as they are ordinarily understood. Similarly, when God is called Al-'Ālī or Al-A'lā, the Most High, or when He is said to be above (*fawq*) the heavens, His *'ulū* and *fawqīyyah*, transcendence or being-above should be understood in the sense they ordinarily mean (*ẓāhir*). However, their modality (*kayfīyyah*) should not be conceived on human pattern. What exactly God's transcendence or being-above means, or what their mode is, is not known to us, even though we know what they ordinarily mean and know that they should be taken in that sense. The same applies to all the attributes which we have mentioned or which belong to their category. Apparently the sense in which Ibn Taymīyyah takes God's *ma'īyyah* being with man or any creature, seems to be inconsistent with his general stand, for he understands it in the sense of knowing, watching of helping. However, the truth is that it is fully consistent with his general stand, for as we have said, the interpretation of a word in a non-literal sense is also the *ẓāhir* meaning of the word if there is an indication by the speaker to that meaning. Ibn Taymīyyah shows that every time *ma'īyyah* is mentioned in the Qur'ān, God has in some way indicated that He uses the word in the non-literal sense.

This is Ibn Taymīyyah's position, not only with regard to the *ṣifat khabarīyyah*, but also with regard to all other attributes. It is one of the most important points of his creed. He has stated and defended it in many of his writings, and it was due to that that he was twice jailed. He argued that this was exactly the position of the *Salaf* and that he was only stating their faith. To support his claim, he quotes profusely from them. Generally, philosophers and theologians who interpret these attributes on metaphorical lines do so because, so they claim, they imply a body for God and

anthropomorphize Him. Ibn Taymīyyah discusses this charge at length and refutes it.

Let us now move to the second part of the creed, prophethood. God chooses men from different nations at a time of His choosing, reveals to them His message and sends them to their peoples to guide them to the right path. If He sends a person to his people who already believe in some prophet, but who do not act upon his teachings, he is a *nabī*, prophet. But if He sends one to a people who are unbelievers (*kāfir*) or polytheists (*mushrik*) he is *rasūl*, messenger. Scholars have distinguished between *nabī* and *rasūl* in various ways, but this is how Ibn Taymīyyah distinguishes between them.

Prophets and messengers are the best men of their communities, with the best powers of mind and heart, most righteous and very respectable in their society. But prophethood should not be treated as a natural gift, nor the prophet as one who has greater talents than others. Prophethood is a special gift from God to a person whom He chooses for some important task; He endows him with some special powers to accomplish those tasks and He helps him in supernatural ways. Al-Fārābī first, followed by Ibn Sīnā next, and then other philosophers, even some Ṣūfīs, conceived of prophethood as a natural phenomenon. They said that the prophet is only distinguished from other people in that he has a better and more powerful faculty to know things, an extraordinarily strong imagination which presents to him his idea in visible forms in waking or in dreams, and a highly developed psychic power which works wonders.

Ibn Taymīyyah reviews in detail this view of prophethood. He points out that, first, prophethood is not a natural phenomenon, that it is not something which the prophets earn; on the contrary, it is simply a divine gift. Second, his revelations are not the ideas

which he himself discovers or works out; they are given to him by God. Third, the angel that comes to him and the things of the *Ghayb* which appear in his vision are realities which exist outside his mind, not within it; they are not at all the creations of his imagination. And the miracles which he works are not the work of his psychic powers; they are brought by God with His Own powers. Further, they are not like the wonders of soothsayers, diviners, and magicians, which do not breach the ordinary laws of nature; they do in reality breach natural laws.

One way to distinguish a real prophet from an imposter is by looking into the wonders they work. Knowledge of things in the future which an imposter mentions are not free from elements that are false; the effects he produces on natural objects are superficial and hardly breach the laws of nature; and the extraordinary experiences he has are caused by Satan. They produce no good effect either on his life or on the lives of his people. On the other hand, the best proof of a true prophet is his life, his teachings, his work and his effect on human beings.

Ibn Taymīyyah has discussed the different forms of *waḥī*, or revelation, which the prophet receives. One form is imparting an idea in the mind of the prophet while awake or asleep. This form is not confined to prophets; it is also given to non-prophets, men and women, who have faith and piety. The second form of *waḥī* is that which is given only to the prophet by an angel, who delivers it either directly to the heart of the prophet or appears to him in human form or in his own angelic form and delivers the *waḥī*. The third kind of *waḥī* is the word of God which He directly addresses to the prophet, as He did to the Moses at Sinai or to Muḥammad during his ascension (*mi'rāj*),

The third article of faith is life hereafter. Philosophers have had various opinions on this subject. Al-Kindī (d. 247/861) affirmed

the resurrection of the body. Al-Fārābī (d. 329/950) had three opinion which he expressed in his different books. In *Al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah* (The Ideal City), he says that all human beings will survive death, the virtuous as well as the wicked. The former will enjoy eternal happiness and the latter will suffer eternal damnation.[16] But in *As-Siyāsah al-Madanīyyah*, on the other hand, he says that only those souls which are perfect in knowledge and virtue will survive death and enjoy happiness thereafter, but the ones which are ignorant and wicked shall perish with death.[17] The third view, which Ibn Taymīyyah also attributes to Al-Fārābī but which is not found in his extant writings, denies resurrection altogether, of the body as well as the soul. Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1036) affirms the resurrection of the body along with the resurrection of the soul[18] in his *An-Najāt* and other writings,[19] but in *Ar-Risālah al-Udhuwīyyah* he affirms only the resurrection of the soul.[20] This is the view which most philosophers held.

The reason that the soul, or the rational soul, to be more precise, will survive death, whereas the body will perish forever, lies deep in the metaphysics which the philosophers borrowed from their Greek masters, according to which pure reason and the immaterial realities that are its object of contemplation are alone everlasting. However, the argument which Ibn Sīnā offers may be stated as follows: so far as the soul is concerned, everyone believes that it will survive death. The body, on the other hand, everyone knows decomposes and is mixed with other particles of the earth. From that part of the earth grow various crops which are eaten by men and animals and become part of their bodies. When they die their bodies again decompose and are assimilated into the earth, from which other crops grow which are again eaten by different men and animals and are assimilated into their bodies. This process

goes on. How then, he asks, are the original particles that constitute the body of the first man to be re-collected? They are no longer intact; they are scattered and assimilated in hundreds of bodies. Again, the particles which once formed part of one became part of a second man and then of a third man. Whose part will they be regarded as, and whose body will they form when resurrected?[21]

Ibn Taymīyyah says that it is not all difficult for God to recreate from the material into which one's body turns after decomposition. The Qur'ān cites cases which God has created from the material into which bodies have turned after decomposition. One such case is that of a person who died, and whose body decomposed and became part of the earth in a hundred years (2:259). The Qur'ān asks why people should wonder that God could create man once again from the earth. Did He not create him from dust in the beginning, and then from sperm, then turned the sperm into a clot of blood, then the clot into flesh, and from the flesh did He not create bones, and finally a perfect man? (23:12-14) If it was possible for God to transform dust into sperm, and the sperm into a clot of blood, and that into bones, and then clothe it with flesh, and finally form a man, why can He not create man from dust again? Every day God is creating innumerable things from other things by transforming one into another, such as the dried earth into green crops, and the dust into a variety of insects and animals on the earth, in the air and under the sea. It asks further why it should be difficult for God to create man again when it was not difficult for the One Who has created greater things like the heavens and earth to create a smaller thing like man. (37:257).

Further, it is not necessary that God create an individual from the same material into which his or her body has decomposed; He can create from similar material. After all, the body that an individual will have in the next life will not be the same body

which or she had earlier. It will be a body similar to the earlier body in some respects and different in others. In fact, it will be a body quite different in size, immensely larger than the former, able to live forever, not just a few years as it is now, a body which will not procreate, which will neither sweat nor pass urine or stool. To the objection that it will not then be the same body, the answer is that it will be in a sense the same body. Even our present bodies in old age is not exactly the same bodies that they were in our youth, or that they were in our infancy, or that they were when we were in the wombs of our mothers. But we do call them the same bodies, and consider them to be our bodies. In the same way the bodies that we will have in the Hereafter will be our bodies, though they will be different in some respects from our present bodies.

The first important idea of Ibn Taymīyyah's regarding man is that he has a particular *fiṭrah.* Drawing upon the verse, "Set your face steadily and truly to the faith, the handiwork of God on which He has created mankind" (30:30), and the *ḥadīth*, "Every child is born with the *fiṭrah*; it is their parents who thereafter turn him or her into a Jew, a Christian, or a Magian,"[22] Ibn Taymīyyah asserts that human beings are born with a definite nature (*fiṭrah*) which provides the grounds for Islamic obligation. We have referred to this concept earlier. We have said that Ibn Taymīyyah finds rational justification for Islam in the original nature (*fiṭrah*) of man. There are some ideas which are, he says, part of the human mind, necessary and self-evident as Descarte calls them, or *a priori*, as Kant characterized them. Some of them were singled out by Aristotle and made part of logic; others lie at basis of the mathematical sciences; still others form the grounds on which the moral codes of man are based. Belief in the Creator, too, is part of *fiṭrah.*

We have already mentioned these ideas. We will now add that Ibn Taymīyyah's concept of *fiṭrah* is wider than this. He says that it is also part of *fiṭrah* that God is one, that He is qualified with all the perfection we can think of, that we should be thankful to God for the blessings He bestows on us, that we should glorify Him, worship Him, and submit to Him. *Fiṭrah* has also biological, social and psychological facets. When we say that man is a social being, that he has certain biological and psychological needs which are to be fulfilled in a proper way, we are referring to another part of *fiṭrah*. It is *fiṭrah* in this comprehensive sense which is the basis of Islam. Islam does not want to change this *fiṭrah*; it only wants to perfect it. No one before Ibn Taymīyyah had ever elaborated the concept of *fiṭrah* in the way he did.

The idea that man is free within certain limits, that his actions are his actions, that he is responsible for what he does and is accountable for it is also a part of his *fiṭrah*. Freedom within limits and responsibility for the deeds one does are inalienable parts of human conscience. They are not contradicted by the belief, which is also part of *fiṭrah*, that God is all-powerful. *Fiṭrah* is a harmonious whole; one part of it does not conflict with another, provided each is conceived of and pursued in the right way. This is the fact to which the Qur'ān refers when it says, "We have created man on the best of patterns (95:4). Ibn Taymīyyah explains at length that God's omnipotence and foreordainment of things are not inconsistent with man's freedom and responsibility. The belief of the determinist that man has no freedom of will at all has no basis in the *fiṭrah* nor in the Qur'ān and Sunnah. Nor is there any reason for the Mu'tazilah, on the other hand, to limit God's omnipotence and place human acts outside His power and ordainment. There is no contradiction in saying that man is free to

choose and do his deeds, while their actual happening depends on the will of God and is brought out by His power. Man is the doer of his deeds while God is their Creator.

On this issue, the Asha'irah also went wrong. They overemphasized God's omnipotence and reduced the efficacy of human will. In addition to asserting that God is the Creator of human acts, they made Him their doer to a great extent. Some of them even said very clearly that there is only one agent there - God. Ibn Taymīyyah rejects this view and says that besides violating common sense, this doctrine goes against Qur'ānic statements. The Qur'ān unambiguously refers various actions to man and calls him their doer. Ibn Taymīyyah also points out that the doctrine of a single Divine Agency paves the way for monistic Ṣūfīs and philosophers to say that God alone exists. The correct view, Ibn Taymīyyah says, is to affirm the reality of both divine and human wills and show that there is no contradiction between them.

For the philosophers, the goal of human life and the ultimate happiness of man lie in the perfection of reason, in the comprehension of ultimate realities and contemplation of them. This is the way, they believe, to imitate God, whom they reduce to a self-thinking thought. For Ṣūfīs the goal of man and his ultimate happiness lie either in the direct knowledge (*ma'rifah*) of reality (*ḥaqq*), self-annihilation (*fanā'*) in God and union (*jam'*) with Him, or the realization that Being is one (*waḥdat al-wujūd*). The goal of the philosophers follows from their metaphysics, and the goal of the Ṣūfīs follows from their mystical experience.

Ibn Taymīyyah says that this question is not to be decided in the light of metaphysics or mystical experience, for neither reason nor experience is competent enough to pronounce a verdict on this

issue; and in fact, there is no need to invoke either. We have the Qur'ān and the Sunnah which give a clear answer to this question. The Qur'ān and Sunnah directly state that man is the servant (*'abd*) of God, and the purpose of his creation is to serve Him. It is in the service (*'ibādah*) of God, that is, in worshiping Him and obeying His commands, that man's happiness lies. Only by serving Him and working for His religion will man achieve the purpose of his life, not by knowing Reality, or losing himself in God, or realizing that Being is one.

Some people think that this *'ibādah,* which is the goal of man's life, only means to worship God, to glorify Him, to offer *ṣalāh*, keep the fast, perform *'umrah* and ḥajj, offer sacrifice, read the Qur'ān and recite God's names. These are certainly *'ibādah*, but not the whole of *'ibādah*. *'Ibādah* means to submit to God in humility and love. Everything which one says or does in submission to God with humility and love is *'ibādah*, whether it is worship, pursuit of virtue, or compliance with divine commandments in any part of life, individual or social, whether it concerns an action of the body, like *ṣalāh* and *jihād,* or action of the mind like faith and *dhikr*, or feelings of the heart like fear, love and trust.

Not only is the goal of man's life and his ultimate happiness to be derived from the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, their details are also to be learned from the same source. How God is to be worshiped, what virtues are to be cultivated, what values are to be pursued, what norms are to be followed, what duties are obligatory, what acts are recommended, and what things are permitted - all these are to be learned form the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. All questions regarding values, norms, and priorities are to be decided on the

basis of the *shar'*, not on any other basis, be it social tradition or mystical experience.

Similarly, the way to serve God best, or how to be a perfect servant of God is also to be learned from the Qur'ān and Sunnah. The Prophet was sent to teach the way to God, the way to purify oneself, to cultivate virtues and piety, to seek God's pleasure (*riḍā*) and nearness (*qurb*). That way (*ṭarīqah*) he fully explained. His companions, by following that *ṭarīqah*, did attain the goal of their lives, their ultimate happiness. Ibn Taymīyyah states all the principal elements of the prophetic *sulūk*: *ṣalāh*, fasting, reading the Qur'ān, *dhikr*, righteous living, loving mankind, preaching Islam, bidding the good and forbidding the evil, and *jihād* in the cause of God. He says that the details of all these elements as the Prophet taught them and the Companions practiced them have been fully preserved and are available to everyone.

Over centuries the Ṣūfīs worked out their own ways (*ṭarīqah)* and pursued their own *sulūk*. They took various elements from the prophetic *sulūk*, but added many things to it. Ibn Taymīyyah mentions two of them in particular. One was the practice of *khalwah*, to retire to a secluded place away from people, to a cave in the mountains or a place in the forest, or to a *zāwīyyah* or *khanqah* built for the purpose, to devote oneself to worship and devotion for a specific period, forty days, for example. Ṣūfīs set a high value on this practice and seek support for it from the retiring of the Prophet to the cave of Ḥira' in his pre-prophetic period. This practice, Ibn Taymīyyah says, is a *bid'ah*, an unjustified innovation. In principle, the actions of the Prophet in pre-prophetic days are not enough to prove that it is his *sunnah* or that we should follow it. It may be noted that during the whole prophetic period he never visited the cave of Ḥira'', though he could have if he had so

wished, nor any other cave. Furthermore, none of his Companions retreated to any cave during his lifetime. Had it been something desirable the Prophet would have recommended it to his people.

The second thing to which Ibn Taymīyyah strongly objects concerns the Ṣūfīs' practice of *dhikr*. He says that all the *dhikr* which the Prophet taught and which are preserved in the books of Ḥadīth are meaningful sentences. There is nothing in them like saying merely the word Allah or the pronoun *hū* (He). Such is reported neither from the Prophet, nor from any of his Companions. This practice is an innovation of the Ṣūfīs and is completely unjustified. Al-Ghazālī is more mistaken when he says that *lā ilāha illā Allah* is the *dhikr* of the common man, and saying *Allah* is the *dhikr* of the elite.

The most important part of the Ṣūfī *sulūk* is the experience of *fanā*. Ibn Taymīyyah knows well that it was part of the prophetic *sulūk*. Later Ṣūfīs like Sheikh Aḥmad Sirhindī (d. 1034/1624) and Shah Walī Allah (d. 1176/1762) of India have clearly said that it was never part of the prophetic *ṭarīqah*.[23] Nevertheless, Ibn Taymīyyah does not call it *bid'ah*. He only objects when a Ṣūfī like Shaykh 'Abdullah Al-Anṣārī Al-Ḥarwī (d. 481/1088) extols the experience as the goal of *sulūk*,[24] or when one like Ibn 'Arabī builds on it the doctrine of the unity of being (*waḥdat al-wujūd*).

Ibn Taymīyyah's strongest and most vehement criticism of *taṣawwūf* is directed against the doctrine of *waḥdat al-wujūd*. As expounded by Ibn 'Arabī, the doctrine stands on two premises. First, the essence of a thing is other than its existence, and it is not a mere non-entity, but something which exists there before it is qualified with existence. Second, the existence of God is identical with the existence of the world.[25] Ibn Taymīyyah refutes bothse doctrines. We have noted earlier that he is a thoroughgoing

nominalist. Hence, starting from that position, it is not difficult for him to refute the reality of the essence prior to its existence. It is easy to see the reason he refutes the identification of God's existence with the existence of the world. He denies in principle anything as absolute existence, or existence as such. What exists out there is this thing or that thing, and the existence of one thing is not the existence of the other. The existence of God is the existence of God, and the existence of the world is the existence of the world. One is not identical with the other. Existence as such is only a mental abstraction, not a reality.

Other grounds on which Ibn Taymīyyah assails the doctrine of the unity of being are those damaging consequences to religion, morality, and life which follow from it. For example, it follows that God's attributes are not real, they are mere relations; the world proceeds from Him necessarily and is not created by His will; man has no will of his own; his actions are done not by him but by God; it is God Who believes or disbelieves and who does good and does evil; it is He Who worships and He Who is worshiped, He Who kills and He Who is killed; there is nothing good or bad in itself; faith and unfaith are one; *tawḥīd* is the same as *shirk*; the worship of idols or gods other than God is the worship of God, for there is no one in existence other than God; the call of the prophets to worship one God is a guile, for there is no god in existence other than God; Hell is not a place of suffering but of joy, different from the joy of Paradise.

Some Ṣūfīs, on the basis of their experiences, the ideas that they get in *kashf*, or the powers they have developed, have said that their *walayāt* is better than the *walāyah* of the prophets, or a *walī* is greater than a *nabī*. They have also said that, like the seal of the prophets, there is also a seal of the saints. Ibn Taymīyyah examines these ideas and shows that they are untrue, that no *walī* is greater

than a *nabī*, or even equal to one. Further, no *walī* can dispense with the revelation and the guidance of the *nabī*. For a man to secure God's *walāyah*, friendship and support, two things are required: faith in God and obedience to His Prophet. Whoever has faith and follows the Prophet is a *walī* of God. It is not necessary for him to follow a Ṣūfī *ṭarīqah*, have mystical experiences, acquire *kashf* and work wonders; *walāyah* is open to everyone, be he a farmer, trader, scholar, *mujāhid* or ruler.

Ibn Taymīyyah reviews the interpretations which Ṣūfīs give to religious virtues such as abstinence (*zuhd*) and love (*war'*), trust and *riḍā*. He shows what part of them is correct in the light of the Qur'ān, the Sunnah, and the words and practices of the Elders, and what part is influenced by their own experiences and ideas. Ibn Al-Jawzī (d. 597/1200) before him had made a similar review in his *Talbīs Iblīs*. Ibn Taymīyyah goes beyond him and expounds in detail what these virtues positively mean in the light of the Qur'ān and Sunnah. This task was further carried out by his disciple, Ibn Al-Qayyīm (d. 751/1350) in his *Madārij as-Sālikīn* and other writings.

An Islamic society is an organized society. Its affairs are to be managed by a government. If there is no government, the community is required to establish one. Except for some innovationist sects like the Khawārij, the rest of the *ummah* is agreed that it is the *duty* of the community to establish a government (*imāmah*) which manages its affairs, promotes its well-being and secures its happiness, establishes the daily prayers, the prayers on Fridays and *'īd* occasions, organizes the ḥajj, collects and distributes the *zakāh*, promotes the true faith and protects it from idolatrous practices, supervises the morals of the society, enjoins the good and forbids the evil, enforces the *hudūd*

punishments, administers justice in all affairs, social, political and economic, maintains peace and order, and protects the community from disruptive elements within and from invading forces without. In short, it establishes the religion (*iqāmat ad-dīn*) in all aspects.

Opinions have differed as to whether the basis of this obligation is reason for the *shar'*. Some Mu'tazilah consider it to be rational and *shar'ī*, while the Asha'irah consider it to be purely *shar'ī*. Ibn Taymīyyah, in consonance with his general position with regard to good and evil, states that it is rational as well as *shar'ī*. Man is a social being; he cannot be happy or secure his well-being unless he lives in an organized society ruled by a just government. The Prophet has commanded a party of just rulers to set up a leader over them and obey his commands. He would all the more like that the community set up a government and obey its regulation. Many of the provisions of the Sharī'ah, such as the collection and the distribution of *zakāh*, the enforcement of *ḥudūd*, establishment of justice, and so on, require an effective government. There are verses in the Qur'ān and many *aḥādīth* of the Prophet which explicitly command Muslims to obey their rulers and order the rulers to fulfill their duties towards the people. Hence the setting up of a strong government is both a rational and *shar'ī* obligation on the community. Not only an obligation, every effort to establish it and serve it in any capacity once it is set up is one of the most commendable acts which secure God's pleasure (*riḍā*) and favor (*qurb*). It is not at all a secular occupation, as many ignorant people think

The concept of an Islamic government on which there is consensus in the *ummah* is that the real ruler is God. He has created the people, and it is for Him to rule them. Sovereignty is His, and He is the Law-giver and the Ruler. Human rulers are to

exercise their power and authority within the limits set by God, according to the law given by Him, in the way prescribed by Him, and for the purpose laid down by Him, either directly or through His Prophet. They are also accountable before Him for each and everything they will do. In other words, authority is a trust (*amānah*) from God, and people act as trustees. Ibn Taymīyyah prefers to use the term *amānah* rather than *khilāfah*. He thinks that the imām, the highest authority in the government, should not be called the deputy (*khalīfah*, or caliph) of God, which implies, in his view, the absence of the real authority or his inability to rule personally. Much can be said against his assumption. It will be sufficient, however, to point out that in actual practice there is no difference between an *amīr* and a *khalīfah*; the difference between them is only a matter of semantics.

The head of the Islamic state and the chief ruler of the government, the imām or the *khalīfah*, is to be chosen from among the Muslim community. Is it necessary that he be from the tribe of Quraysh? On this point most Muslim thinkers have said that he should be a Qurayshī. The Khawārij were the first to differ from that condition and believed that any Muslim could be imām provided he fulfilled the other requirements. From among the Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah, Qāḍī Abū Bakr Al-Baqillānī (d. 404/1013), as Ibn Khaldūn has said, also believed that the post was open to all Muslims.[26] Ibn Taymīyyah sides with the majority view, but says that if a competent Qurayshī is not available, a non-Qurayshī may be chosen.

On the procedure for the election of an imām, the constitution of an electoral college (*ahl al-ḥall wa al-'aqd*), and the ratification of the elected imām by the oath of allegiance (*bay'ah*) from the community, Ibn Taymīyyah subscribes to the view of the majority

of the scholars. However, with regard to the qualifications for *imāmah*, he is more realistic than his predecessors, Al-Mawrādī (d. 450/1058) and Abū Ya'lā (d. 490/1097).

It is possible for an imām to make mistakes or commit sins. Like the scholars of the Ahl as-Sunnah, Ibn Taymīyyah rejects in the strongest terms the Shī'ī doctrine of the infallibility and innocence of the imām, as he rejects in unequivocal terms their effort to confine the *imāmah* to the family of 'Alī and Fāṭimah, may God be pleased with them. He is also one with the majority of the Sunnīs' view that the imām may be deposed by the people if he fails to perform certain of his duties. However, obedience to the imām in things that are not wrong is a bound duty on the people. They are only to abstain from obedience when it involves sin against God.

*Imāmah* or *khilāfah* as defined above is the correct and the proper kind of government in Islam. But if someone seizes power and establishes his rule and acts according to the Sharī'ah, it will be acceptable on grounds of expediency. Monarchy (*mulk*) is a legitimate form of government under certain conditions, but it is not at all the ideal Islamic government. Its legitimacy is based on the fact that the effort needed to change it may cause more harm than good. Though legitimate on grounds of expediency, a monarchy is bound by the same rules as the caliphate; so it should work within the same limits and according to the same laws. Absolute monarchy is inconceivable in Islam.

The constitution of the caliphal government, the distribution of powers among the authorities, and other matters of detail are open questions to be decided by the community in the light of the traditions of the rightly guided caliphs (*al-khulafā' ar-rāshidūn*). The guiding principle should be how to accomplish best the

objectives which God has set before the Islamic government and how to secure the well-being of all sections of the community, not only that of a person, family, tribe, class or section.

These are some important aspects of the great innovative work which Ibn Taymīyyah did on the plane of ideas. We have not touched on all the aspects. The reader may go through the pages of this book and find others from the words of the *Shaykh al-Islām* himself. He will certainly find them no less illuminating and inspiring. Ibn Taymīyyah did not limit himself to expounding ideas; he preached them, fought for them and bore patiently all the suffering that his opponents might inflict on him. For the cause he was sent to prison time and again, and it was in prison that he laid down his life like a true martyr.

Ibn Taymīyyah did not carry out *jihād* with the pen alone: he also fought with the sword. History will remember how he worked day and night, persuading Muslim armies and commanders to fight against the Mongols, and how he himself fought alongside them with faith and courage until God turned the tide against the Mongols. This side of his work, and the campaigns that he led against popular forms of *shirk* and against the enemies of Islam within the community itself, we have not mentioned, but they are also worthy of study.

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, malāḥim:1.

[2] Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, 'ilm:10; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, 'ilm:1; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, muqaddamah:17; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, v:196.

[3] Salāḥ ad-Dīn Al-Munajjid, *Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymīyyah, Sīratuhu wa Akhbāruhu 'ind al-Mawrikhīn*, Beirut, Dār Al-Kutub Al-Jadīdah, 1976, p. 19.

[4] For these details see Majīd Fakhrī, *History of Islamic Philosophy*, Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1970, pp. 313ff.

[5] Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, faḍā'il aṣ-ṣaḥābah:6; anbiyā':54; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, faḍā'il aṣ-ṣaḥābah, 23; At-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, manāqib:17; Aḥmad, *Musnad*, 6:55.

[6] For discussion of these points see Dr. 'Alī Sāmī Nashshār, *Manhāj al-Baḥth 'ind Mufakkirī al-Islām*, Beirut, Dār An-Nahḍah, 1984, pp. 187-279.

[7] Ibn Taymīyyah, *Al-Furqān bayn al-Ḥaqq wa al-Bāṭil*, 1:74.

[8] See my *Ṣūfism and Sharī'ah*, Islamic Foundation, Leicester, U.K. 1986, pp. 31-33.

[9] Ibn Taymīyyah, *Kitāb an-Nubūwwāt*, Riyadh, n.d., p. 39.

[10] Ibn Taymīyyah, *Minhāj as-Sunnah*, Cairo, Bulāq, 1321, 1:96.

[11] Miskawayh, *Al-Fawz al-Asghar*, Cairo, Maṭba'at as- Sa'ādah, pp. 12-16. For Ibn Sīnā's remark see 'Abdur-Raḥmān Badawī, *Araṣṭū 'ind al-'Arab*, Cairo, An-Nahḍah, 1947, p. 23.

[12] Ibn Rushd, *Al-Kashf 'an Manāhij al-Adillah*, Muḥammad Qāsim, ed., Cairo, Maktabat Al-Anjalo, 1964, p. 15- 154.

[13] Sayd Sharīf Al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, 1325 A.H., 8:379.

[14] Ibn Taymīyyah, *Minhāj as-Sunnah,* op. cit., 1:39.

[15] Ibn Rushd, *Al-Kashf 'an Manāhij al-Adillah,* op. cit. p. 232.

[16] Al-Fārābī. *Arā' Ahl al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah,* Cairo, Maktabat Al-Husayn At-Tijārīyyah, 1948, p. 121.

[17] Al-Fārābī, *As-Siyāsāt al-Madanīyyah,* Hyderabad, 1994, p. 53; See also, M. 'Abdul-Ḥaqq Anṣārī, *The Moral Philosophy of Al-Farabi,* Aligarh, 1965, pp. 53-54.

[18] Ibn Taymīyyah, *Ar-Radd 'alā al-Mantiqiyyīn,* Bombay, 1949, p. 458.

[19] Ibn Sīnā, *An-Najāt*, Cairo, Al-Kurdī, 1938, p. 291; Fī Aqsām al-'Ulūm al-'Aqlīyyah, included in *Tisa' Rasā'il fī al-Ḥikmah wa Aṭ-Ṭabī'īyyāt*, Hyderabad, 1908, pp. 114-15.

[20] Ibn Sīnā, *Ar-Risālah al-'Uḍwīyyah fī Amr al-Ma'ād,* ed. Sulaymān Dunyā, Cairo, 1949, p. 57.

[21] See note 20.

[22] Al Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, janā'iz, 80: tafsīr, 30:1, qadr:3; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, qadr, 22, 23, 24; Aḥmad, *Musnad,* II: 315, 346.

[23] Sheikh Aḥmad Sirhindī, *Maktubāt Imām Rabbānī,* Vol. 1, letter 113; Shah Walī Allah, Hamdāt, ed. Nūr Al-Ḥaqq 'Alawī and Ghulām Muṣṭafā, Hyderabad; Pakistan, 1964, pp. 16-17. See also my *Ṣūfism and Sharī'ah*, pp. 64, 66-67.

[24] Ibn Taymīyyah, *Majmū' Fatāwā Shaykh al-Islām,* Riyadh, vol. X, p. 498.

[25] Ibn Taymīyyah, *Ḥaqīqat Madhhab al-Ittiḥādiyyīn,* included in *Rasā'il wal-Masā'il,* ed Rāshid Riḍā, Cairo, Vol. 4, pp. 6-17.

[26] See Ibn Khaldūn, *muqaddamat,* Dār Baḥth, Makkah, 4th. ed. 1978, p. 194f.

# PART I

# EPISTEMOLOGICAL

# FOUNDATIONS

## 1. Human Nature (*Fiṭrah*), Reason and Revelation

### (1.1) The essential nature (*fiṭrah*) of man

Every human being is born in the nature of Islam. If this nature is not subsequently corrupted by the erroneous beliefs of the family and society, everyone will be able to see the truth of Islam and embrace it.

The Prophet (pbuh) said, "All human beings are born with *fiṭrah*, the nature (of Islam). It is their parents who make them Jew, Christian or Zoroastrian."[1]

What he meant is that there is a certain nature with which God created man, and that is the nature of Islam. God endowed mankind with this essential nature the day He addressed them saying, "Am I not your Lord?" and they said, "Yes, You are" (7:172). *Fiṭrah* is the original nature of man, uncorrupted by subsequent beliefs and practices, ready to accept the true ideas of Islam. Islam is nothing but submitting to Allah, and to none else; this is the meaning of the words, "There is no god except Allah."

Elucidating this concept, the Prophet (pbuh) said, "Man is born with a perfectly sound nature (*fiṭrah*), just as a baby animal is born to its parents, fully formed without any defect to its ears, eyes or any other organ."[2] He thus emphasized that a sound heart is like a sound body, and a defect is something alien which intervenes. Muslim, the famous compiler of *ḥadīth*, has recorded in his *Ṣaḥīḥ* from 'Iyād Ibn Ḥimār that the Prophet (pbuh) once quoted God's words: "I created my people faithful to none but Me; afterwards the devils came upon them and misled them. They forbade them what I had permitted, and commanded them to associate with Me ones I had never authorized."[3]

The *fiṭrah* is to the truth as the light of the eye is to the sun. Everyone who has eyes can see the sun if there are no veils over them. The erroneous beliefs of Judaism, Christianity and

Zoroastrianism act like veils, preventing people from seeing the truth. It is common experience that people whose natural sense of taste is not spoiled love sweets; they never dislike them unless something spoils the sense of taste.

However, the fact that people are born with *fiṭrah* does not mean that a human body is actually born with Islamic beliefs. To be sure, when we come out of the wombs of our mothers, we know nothing. We are only born with an uncorrupted heart which is able to see the truth of Islam and submit to it. If nothing happens which corrupts the heart we would eventually become Muslims. This power to know and to act which develops into Islam when there is nothing to obstruct it or affect its natural working is the *fiṭrah* on which God has created man.
[*Fatāwā* 4:245-7]

### (1.2) Prophets address the *Fiṭrah*

*Prophets address the* fiṭrah *of man and appeal to it, for knowledge of the Truth is inherent in the* fiṭrah.

No prophet has ever addressed his people and asked that they should first of all know the Creator, that they should look into various arguments and infer from them His existence, for every heart knows god and recognizes His existence. Everyone is born with the *fiṭrah*; only something happens afterwards which casts a veil over it. Hence, when one is reminded, one recalls what was there in one's original nature (*fiṭrah*).

That is why God sent Moses (and Aaron) to Pharaoh. He said, "Speak (to him) in soft words; he might recall" (20:44); [that is, he might recall] the knowledge inherent in his original nature regarding his Lord and His blessings on him, and that he depends upon Him completely. This may lead him to faith in his Lord, or cause him "to fear" (20:44) punishment in the Hereafter in case he denies Him. This, too, may lead to faith. That is why God has said,

"Call to the path of your Lord with wisdom (*ḥikmah*) and polite admonition (*maw'izah*)" (16:725). *Ḥikmah* is to explain the truth so that one who wants to accept it rather than reject it may accept. But if he rejects it because of his evil desires he should be admonished and warned.

Knowledge of the truth leads to its acceptance, because the love the truth is endowed in human nature. Truth is dearer and more acceptable to the *fiṭrah* of man than untruth, which has no basis on which to stand and is abhorred by the *fiṭrah*. However, if truth and knowledge do not lead a person to faith, he should be warned against his refusal and threatened with punishment. People do fear punishment and try to avoid what may cause them pain, even though they may not move to secure what is good and useful.

Some people only indulge in base desires and belie the punishment they are threatened with, or try to forget it so that they may do what they want without feeling any prick in their hearts, for if they recognized the punishment and remembered it, they would not indulge their evil desires. One is either ignorant or forgetful before one commits evil. That is why all sinners against God are ignorant.
[*Fatāwā* 16:338-9]

### (1.3) Reason is necessary but not sufficient

*Reason is prerequisite to the acquisition of knowledge, as well as for the performance of a good deed or righteous act. Mystical states like ecstasy or intoxication, which involve the suppression of reason, are imperfect states of mind, and ideas that conflict with reason are false. However, reason is not self-sufficient; it cannot dispense with revelation, which alone gives the knowledge of realities that transcend it.*

Many theologians base their ideas simply on reason, and rely exclusively on it. They subject it to the faith and the Qur'ān.

Knowledge is derived from general principles of reason sufficient in themselves without a recourse to faith on the Qur'ān.

Most Ṣūfīs, on the other hand, condemn reason and find fault with it. They assert that sublime states and higher spiritual stages are never attained without negating reason. They expound ideas which contradict reason and lead to rapture, ecstasy and intoxication. They believe in truths and experiences which, as they claim, accrue only when reason is completely suppressed; they also believe in things that are clearly denied by reason or are not attested to by it.

Both these sources are wrong. To be sure, reason is prerequisite to all knowledge, as it is the prerequisite of virtue and good life. With it we acquire knowledge and virtue, but it is not sufficient by itself. It is only a faculty of the soul, a power like the power of vision in the eye. It works only when it receives light from faith and the Qur'ān, as the eye sees only when it receives light from the sun or a fire.

Left to itself, reason cannot know things which it is not equipped to know by itself. On the other hand, when it is completely suppressed, the ideas that one receives and the acts that one performs may be things such as happen to the animals. One may have love and ecstasy and other experiences, but they will not be different from what the animals get. Hence the states that one attains to by negating reason are defective, and the ideas one receives contrary to reason are false.

Prophets came with knowledge which reason could not attain in and of itself; never did they come with what reason considers to be impossible. People who place unjustified faith in reason readily make statements regarding the necessity, possibility or impossibility of things purely on the basis of reason; they work all the while under the impression that their views are correct, whereas they are false; they are even audacious enough to oppose the views which the prophets taught. On the other hand, those who decry reason and affirm things that are false, revel in satanic states

and evil practices, and cross the boundaries which the sense of discrimination (between good and evil) draws, with which God has endowed man and elevated him above other creatures.

Among the people of *ḥadīth* (*ahl al-ḥadīth*)[4] there are also some who lean towards one or the other of these two groups. They sometimes bring down reason from its position, and sometimes put it against the prophetic practices (*sunan*).
[*Fatāwā* 3:338-9]

## (1.4) Knowledge of good and evil

*Acts are of three kinds. One is those which are good or bad even before the shar' comes with its verdict regarding them; their goodness or badness is known through reason (as well as the shar'). This, however, does not imply that one who commits evil will be punished in 'alā, although the shar' had not declared its verdict. The second kind is those that acquire the property of goodness or badness on account of the command of the Law-Giver (Ash-Shari') regarding them, and thus become good or bad. The third kind is those which the Law-Giver commands only in order to see if one will obey Him or not. In such cases what matters is the command, not what is commanded.*

On the question of whether good or evil are known through reason, there are different views among the Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah,[5] the followers of the four schools of jurisprudence, as well as others. The Ḥanafīs and many of the Mālikis, Shāfi'īs and Ḥanbalīs believe in their rationality. This is also the view of the Karrāmīs[6] and the Mu'tazilah,[7] as well as that of many sects among Muslims, Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians and other religions. On the other hand, many followers of Ash-Shāfi'ī, Mālik and Ibn Ḥanbal oppose that position; this is the view of the Ash'arīs.[8]

However, the Ahl as-Sunnah do not differ with respect to the issue of *qadr*.[9] They believe that God has power over everything,

that He is the Creator of human acts as well as all other things, and that what He wills happens and what He does not will does not happen. The Mu'tazilah and others who uphold the autonomy of human will (Qadarīyyah)[10] hold the opposite view; they deny *qadr* and are guilty of unjustified innovation (*bid'ah*). Some people think that those who believe in the rationality of good and evil deny *qadr*; they bracket them with the Mu'tazilah on the issue of divine justice (*ta'dīl wa tajwīr*).[11] This is not correct. The majority of Muslims do not side with the Mu'tazilah in this regard, nor do they agree with the Ash'arīs in their denial of purpose in divine actions, or in their negation of causes in the nature. On the contrary, all these groups believe in *qadr* and affirm that God is the Creator of everything, including human acts, and that what He wills happens, and what He does not will does not happen.

However, it is only the extremists among the Mu'tazilah who deny God's fore-knowledge of things or His fore-ordaining of human actions. All others believe that God knows in advance what men will do, and testify to the prophetic sayings on the issue that God has determined everything before their creation. They believe, for example, in the *ḥadīth* which Muslim has recorded on the authority of Ibn 'Umar, "God ordained everything pertaining to creation fifty thousand years before He created the heavens and the earth, when His throne was on the waters."[12]

Both Al-Bukhārī and Muslim have also recorded the *ḥadīth* reported by Ibn Mas'ūd: The Prophet said - and he has said nothing but truth - "Your formation in the womb of your mothers goes on in stages: The first stage of semen extends to forty days, the second stage of blood-clot extends also to the same duration; then the angel is called and given orders regarding four things. He is asked to write the provision of the person, the duration of his or her life, his or her actions, and whether he or she shall be happy or unhappy. Then the soul is breathed into him or her. By God, Who has power over all life, you may go on doing good deeds, as the people of Paradise should do, till Paradise is at your arm's length.

Then God's writ overtakes you and you do the deeds of the people of Hell, and eventually enter into Hell. On the other hand, you may go on doing the deeds of the people of Hell till Hell is at your arm's length. At that time the writ of God overtakes you, and you do the deeds of the people of Paradise and finally enter it."[13] There are other *aḥādīth* also on the subject. Most of the Qadarīyyah accept them; only the extremists among them deny them.

The majority of Muslims also affirm the existence of causes which God has ordained as causes in the process of creation He carries on and off reasons regarding the commands He issues. They affirm the wise purpose which He pursues in His creation as well as in His enactments. They testify to all the statements that God has made to this effect in the Qur'ān, such as: "(There are signs) in the rain which God sends down from the skies, and in the life which He gives therewith" (2:164); or "He causes rain to descend on (the dead land) and produce every kind of harvest therewith" (7:57). The Qur'ān and the Sunnah abound with such statements. Muslims in general also make statements such as "X has done this by means of Y," rather than "X has done this at the time of Y."

The point I am making is that the issue of knowledge of good and evil is not tied to the issue of *qadr*. Now that this has been clarified, let me state that there are three different views regarding knowledge of good and evil, two on the extremes and one in the middle. The first view is that good and evil are rational, that they are the essential properties of acts, and that the *shar'* only reveals those properties rather than generating them. This is the view which the Mu'tazilah hold and which is not sound. If one extends this ethical doctrine to theology and claims that what is good for man is also good for God and what is evil for man is also evil for God, one would arrive at the false notion of the Qadarīyyah, including that regarding divine justice. These people are guilty of anthropomorphism; they liken divine acts to human acts and human acts to divine acts. This is as wrong as likening divine

attributes to human attributes or human attributes to divine attributes.

God's acts cannot be judged on the pattern of human acts, for people are servants while He is their Lord. They wrong each other and commit shameful acts, and He has power to stop them, but He does not do so. This is not something evil for Him, for He may have some higher purpose behind it or may have some good to bestow on His people. This is what the Elders, the *fuqahā'* and Muslims in general believe; they all affirm that creation, as well as the legislative activity of God, is purposive.

Those who say that God's creative act has no purpose or that His command pursues no need affirm a will that chooses one thing against the other without any reason. Ibn Kullāb[14] and his followers subscribe to this view, which was propounded originally by the Qadarīyyah and the Jahmīyyah.[15]

The second view on the issue is that acts of God have neither the qualities of goodness nor of evil, nor the properties on account of which they are characterized as good or evil. God simply wills one thing against another just because He wills it, rather than for any reason or purpose which He may pursue by creation or command. The expanders of this view are not even shy to say that God could command one to associate partners with Him, or find fault with serving Him alone, or order unjust and shameful acts, or forbid virtue and piety. For them, all ethical judgments are relative; good is not something good in itself, nor is evil something evil in itself. When God says, "He [the Prophet] commands them what is just (*ma'rūf) and forbids them what is evil (munkar*), He is permitting what is good and prohibiting what is evil (and impure)" (7:157). This would mean, according to their view, that He commands what He commands, forbids what He forbids, permits what He permits and prohibits what He prohibits. In fact, the objects commanded or forbidden, permitted or prohibited are neither good nor evil nor right or wrong in themselves, except when they are taken to mean what suits people. It also follows that

God neither loves any good not hates any evil.

This view and its implications are unacceptable, for they are opposed to the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, and to the concensus of the Elders and the jurists. They are also opposed to common sense. They have nothing to do with God, for exalted is He above them. He has Himself said, "No, God never commands what is shameful" (7:28). He has also dissociated Himself from putting good on the same level as evil when He has said, "What! Do those who seek after evil ways think that We shall hold them equal with those who believe and do righteous deeds, that equal will be their life and death? Ill is the judgment that they render" (45:21); or, "Shall We then treat the people of faith like the people of sin?" (68:35); or, "Shall We treat those who believe and work deeds of righteousness the same as those who do mischief on earth? Shall We treat those who guard against evil the same as those who turn aside from the right? (38:28). But according to the view of these people who deny (objectivity to ethical judgments) it is all the same if you equate the righteous with the wicked or elevate them over the latter. To dissociate God from the former is no better than to associate Him with the latter. This certainly violates the Scripture as well as reason.

God has said, "God knows best whom to charge with His mission" (6:124). But for these people charging someone with a mission does not require any qualities on his part before or after his commission, just as obligating people with some act does not presume any properties in the act. Jurists as well as the common folk of the Muslim community say, on the contrary, that God prohibits the *wrong*, which is thereby prohibited, and commands the *right*, which becomes thereby a duty. We have two things here: one, the act of obligation or prohibition, which the word of God makes; and, two, the obligatory or forbidden character of an act, which is a property of the act. God is knowing and wise. He knows the good that His command entails. It is on the basis of His knowledge of the good or the evil of the people involved in the

command or the prohibition, or the etchings commanded or prohibited, that He commands or prohibits. To be sure, it is He Who makes an act obligatory or forbidden, but as for the property of the act, it may be present before or without the command.

If you look at the words of the *shar'* and the ends which its rules pursue, you will find three kinds of acts. The first are those which involve some kind of good or evil even before the *shar'* commanded them. We know, for example, that justice leads to the well-being of people, and injustice involves their suffering. Such acts are therefore good or evil (in themselves); their goodness or evil is known even through reason, as well as through the *shar'*, but not in the sense that the *shar'* invests them with a property which they did not have before. However, in affirming an independent property of evil in some act it by no means follows that their doers will be punished in the Hereafter, even if the *shar'* had not come with its verdict.

This is a point on which the extremists among those who believe in the rationality of good and evil have gone wrong. They say that people will be punished for their evil deeds even if no messenger had been sent to them. They go against the statements of the Qur'ān, such as, "We would not punish until We had sent a messenger (to give warning)" (17:15); or "Messengers who gave good news as well as warning that mankind after (the coming) of the messengers should have no plea against God" (14:165); or "Your Lord was not one to destroy a population until He had sent to its center a messenger, rehearsing to them our verses, nor are we going to destroy a population except when its members practice iniquity" (28:59); or "Every time a group is cast therein, it keepers will ask, 'Did no warner come to you?' They will say, 'Yes, indeed, a Warner did come to us, but we rejected him and said, "God never sent down any (messenger);" you are in nothing but an egregious delusion.' They will further say, 'Had we but listened or used our intelligence we should (now) be among the companions of the blazing fire'" (68:8-10). Both Al-Bukhārī and Muslim have

recorded that the Prophet (pbuh) said, "No one is more generous in accepting an excuse than Allah. This is why He sends messengers to people who give good tidings and warnings."[16] There are many more texts on the subject that fully underscore the point that God does not punish people unless He had sent His Message to them. These texts refute the claim of the rationalists that people are punished even if no messenger is sent to them.

The second kind of acts are those which *become* good when the *shar'* commands them, or *become* evil when it forbids them. They acquire the property of goodness or evil by virtue of the command of the *shar'*.

The third kind of acts are those which the Law-Giver (Ash-Shāri') commands just to see whether people carry out His commands or not; the performance of the act as such is not what is desired. For example, Abraham was told to slaughter his son. When he and his son submitted to the command and Abraham laid his son on the ground, the objective was achieved. Abraham was thereafter given a lamb to sacrifice in place of his son. Another example is the *ḥadīth* that tells of a leper, a bald man and a blind man. When God sent them an angel to beg for charity and only the blind man responded to his request, the angel said, "Keep your money with you. God only intended to test you people. He is pleased with you, and is angry with the two others."[17] This illustrates that the intention of a particular command may be the command itself and not the thing commanded.

The Mu'tazilah, did not understand this kind of act or the one mentioned before it. They were wrong in thinking that there are no good or evil acts other than those which are independent of the decree of the *shar'*. The Ash'arīs, on the other hand, believed that all the commands of the Sharī'ah are of the third kind, just for trial, and that they have no property whatsoever before or even after the word of the *shar'*. Men of knowledge and wisdom (*ḥukamā'*)[18] and Muslims in general recognize these three types of acts. And this is the correct view.

[*Fatāwā* 8:428-436]

**(1.5) Knowledge of God and His unity.**

*People have various views as to how we know God and His unity and what the basis for obligation is in this regard. The best view on this subject is that acts have properties which make them good and obligatory or evil and forbidden. This fact is often known by reason, but God does not punish anyone except after His message has reached him.*

Opinions have differed regarding the means of knowing God and His unity and other basic principles of religion. Is it the *shar'* which gives us knowledge about them, and defines our obligations or is it the case that we know them through our reason, while it is the *shar'* which makes them obligatory? Or is it the case that reason is both means of their knowledge and the instrument of their obligation? These are three known views on the subject, and each one is held by various sections among the followers of the founders of the four schools of *fiqh*, Aḥmad and others.

One group is of the view that the source of knowledge as well as the basis of obligation is nothing but the *shar'*. The Salīmīyyah[19] and others such as Shaykh Abū Al-Farāj Al-Maqdīsī[20] belong to this group. The followers of Aḥmad and others from the Ahl as-Sunnah have also been reported to hold this view. It is also held by Ibn Dirbās,[21] Ibn Shukr[22] and many other followers of Ash-Shāfi'ī. From the scholars of *ḥadīth* and *fiqh*, those who condemn *kalām* generally subscribe to it. This is the issue on which a controversy had flared up between the companions of the theologian Ṣadaqah Ibn Al-Ḥusayn Al-Ḥanbalī[23] and a faction of Aḥmad's followers, as well as between Abū Al-Farāj Ibn Al-Jawzī[24] and another faction of the Ḥanbalīs. The former parties contended that the *shar'* is both source of knowledge and the basis of obligation, whereas the latter group

said that the source of knowledge is reason but the basis of obligation is the *shar'*. Al-Āmidī[25] has mentioned three views regarding the source of knowledge. One, it is reason alone, independent of Revelation (*as-sam'*), as Ar-Rāzī[26] has said; second, it is revelation, that is to say, the Qur'ān and the Sunnah; and third, both of them are sources of ethical knowledge. And it is the last one which Al-Āmidī has preferred, and it is the correct view.

The second view is that the instrument of obligation is the *shar'* alone, even though reason is also a source of knowledge. This is the view of Al-Ash'arī[27] and his followers, as well as Qāḍī Abū Ya'lā,[28] Ibn Az-Zaghunī,[29] Ibn 'Āqil,[30] and others. The third view is that the source of knowledge as well as the instrument of obligation is reason. This is the view of the Mu'tazilah, the Karrāmīyyah and many others from the followers of *a'immah*, such as Abū Al-Ḥasan Al-Āmidī, Abū Al-Aṭṭāb[31] and others. Sections of Māliki, Shāfi'ī and Ḥanafī scholars also hold this view; even Abū Ḥanīfah[32] is reported to have subscribed to it. It has been noted that the Mu'tazilah, Abū Bakr Ar-Rāzī,[32a] and Abū Al-Khaṭṭāb have clearly stated that even those who have not received the words of any prophet will be punished on account of their violation of the dictates of reason.

We have mentioned that the most reasonable view on the subject is that acts possess properties which make them good and obligatory, or evil and forbidden, and that is often known by reason. But God does not punish people except after they have received His message, as He has said, "We do not punish people unless we have sent to them a messenger" (17:15). This is a general proclamation from God, and He has not differentiated between one kind of act and the other.

[*Kitāb An-Nubūwwāt* 162-3]

### (1.6) The place of *waḥī*

*Things of the world which are the objects, for example, of medicine, mathematics and commerce are known through reason. But divine things and religious truths are only known from the Prophet. He knows them best and is most competent to expound them. At times he also advances rational arguments for them. We are to take all that he says quite serious, his statements as well as his arguments, and build upon them.*

Knowledge is what is demonstrable, and of that what is useful has been conveyed by the prophets. However, there is a part of knowledge which we get from other sources. This concerns the matters of the world, such as the objects of medicine, mathematics, agriculture and commerce. But so far as divine things and religious truths are concerned, the only source of their knowledge is the Prophet. He knows them best, is most eager to preach them to the masses and most competent to formulate and expound them. He is above everyone in knowledge, will and competence - things which are required to accomplish his mission perfectly. Everyone else is deficient in knowledge, has a distorted idea of things, or lacks the urge to preach what he knows either because he is seeking something else, entertains some fears or does not have sufficient power to expound his ideas clearly and forcefully to the conviction of the people.

Sometimes the Prophet advances rational arguments in support of the truths he preaches. The Qur'ān is full of rational arguments and clear proofs regarding divine realities and religious truths. Sometimes the Prophet only states them, for he has already offered clear and convincing proofs to establish the fact that he is a prophet of God bearing a message from Him, that he is telling nothing about God except the truth, and that God has Himself borne witness for him and told people that he is honest and reliable in delivering His message to them. In fact, there are many arguments

to establish that he is the Messenger of God; some of them are rational and verifiable by reason, others are religious and revealed, but the Prophet explained them to people and demonstrated them. Theologians of different affiliations are agreed that the Qur'ān offers rational arguments on religious matters. They often mention them in their theological and exegetical works. They also make use of religious and revealed arguments in various matters; since they have established the veraciousness of the Prophet, he must be believed, they say, in whatever he states.

Knowledge is of three kinds. One is not known except through rational arguments. Concerning this category, the best arguments are those which the Qur'ān has stated and the Prophet has mentioned. Let it be known that the best and the most perfect rational arguments are the ones which are received from the Prophet. I emphasize this fact because many people do not know it. Some people reject outright all rational arguments, since they believe that they have been manufactured by the theologians. Others do not reflect on the Qur'ān, or try to understand the rational and convincing arguments which it offers, because they have somehow developed the idea that the Qur'ān only states truths. They think that one should first ascertain the veracity of a prophet and the authenticity of the words he has said on rational grounds, and then deduce the truth of his statements from the truth of his prophethood.

The other kind of knowledge is that which a non-prophet has no way of knowing except through a prophet; his word alone is the argument for it. This knowledge is concerned with details regarding God, angels, the Throne, Paradise and Hell, as well as details regarding things which the prophet enjoins or forbids. As for as the existence of the Creator and His unity, knowledge, power, will, wisdom, and mercy, these matters can be known through reason. But the arguments and the proofs which the prophet offers in these matters are the most perfect and rational arguments. However, prophetic word is not the only means for

knowing them, even though it does offer certain knowledge. These things are, therefore, known by the rational arguments which the prophet offers as well as by his word, since his veracity has been established by arguments, proofs and miracles.

People have also differed concerning knowledge of the life hereafter and knowledge of good and evil. The majority is of the view that they are known through reason as well as revelation (*as-sam'*). However, those who uphold the rationality of the knowledge of good and evil are more than those who uphold the rationality of the knowledge of the Hereafter. Abū Al-Khaṭṭāb noted that this is the view of most of the jurists and theologians. The other view is that we know about the life hereafter and about good and evil from no other means than the word of the Prophet. This is the view of Al-Ash'arī and his followers, as well as many others from the followers of the *a'immah*, such as Qāḍī Abū Ya'lā, Abū Al-Ma'ālī Al-Juwaynī,[33] Abū Al-Walīd Al-Bājī,[34] and so on. However, bothse groups agree that there are things that are known through reason as well as through the word of the Prophet, such as the issue of whether human acts are created by God or not, pr whether we shall see Him in the Hereafter.

What I want to say is that one should take from the Prophet the knowledge of all divine and religious matters, both those that are merely revelational and those that are rational, and base upon it all one's rational arguments, since what he has said is true in principle as well as in detail. Arguments for the veracity of the Prophet establish the truth of his teachings in principle, and the rational arguments that the Qur'ān and the *ḥadīth* expound demonstrate that in detail.

Again, prophets and messengers are sent first of all to give this very knowledge; they are, therefore, the most knowledgeable on these matters, the most competent to teach them, and the most honest about them. Those who examine what they say and what the others say in such matters find that the truth is with the prophets and that others are mistaken. This is asserted by Ar-Rāzī,[35] who is

extremely critical of arguments from tradition and is known to have made the statement that arguments from tradition fail to produce conviction. No other recognized scholar has come out with such a scathing remark.

But it is he who is reported to have said, "I have long pondered theological and philosophical arguments, and have finally reached the conclusion that they do not generate certainty. In comparison to them, the arguments of the Qur'ān are more convincing. Read, for example, the verse, 'To Him mount up (all) words of purity' (35:10), or the verse, 'The most gracious One is firmly established on the Throne' (20:5), which describe God in positive terms. Read also the verse, 'There is nothing whatsoever like unto Him' (42:11), which describes Him in negative terms." Thereafter, he said, "Whoever goes through the experience I have gone through will reach the same conclusion I have reached."

Similarly, if you consider those who do not follow the prophets nor have faith in their teachings, you will find them skeptical, perplexed and ignorant of the truth, or ignorant as well as conceited. They are like those about whom the Qur'ān has said, "As for the unbelievers, their deeds are like a mirage in sandy deserts, which the man parched with thirst mistakes for water until, when he comes up to it, he finds it to be nothing. He only finds God who will pay Him his account; and God is swift in taking account. Or their state is like the depths of darkness in a vast, deep ocean overwhelmed with billow topped by billow, topped by (dark) clouds: depths of darkness, one above another. If a man stretch out his hand he can hardly see it, for any to whom God gives not light, there is no light at all." (24:39-40).
[*Fatāwā* 13:136-141]

### (1.7) The Correct Way to Interpret the Qur'ān

*The correct way is to explain the Qur'ān through the Qur'ān itself, then through the Sunnah of the Prophet, then with the help of*

*the comments of the Companions, and then the comments of the rightful Successors. Never should one go against an interpretation on which they all agree. To explain the Qur'ān simply on the basis of one's reason, without knowing all these things, is forbidden.*

The best way is to explain the Qur'ān is through the Qur'ān. What the Qur'ān alludes to in one place is explained in another, and what it says in brief on one occasion is elaborated upon on another. But if this does not help you, you should turn to the Sunnah, because the Sunnah explains and elucidates the Qur'ān. Imām 'Abdullah Muḥammad Ibn Idrīs Ash-Shāfi'ī[36] said, "All that the Prophet has said is what he has derived from the Qur'ān." God has said, "We have sent down to you the Book in truth that you may judge between men, as God guides you; so do not be an advocate for those who betray their trust" (4:105); and, "We have sent down to you the message that you may explain clearly to people what has been sent to them, and that they may think over it." (16:44). Again: "We sent down the Book to you for the express purpose that you make clear to them those things in which they differ, and that it should be a guide and mercy to those who believe" (16:64). This is why the Prophet (pbuh) said, "Know that I have been given the Qur'ān and something like it,"[37] namely the Sunnah. In fact, the Sunnah, too, was given to him through *waḥī* like the Qur'ān, except that it was not recited to him as the Qur'ān was. Imām Ash-Shāfi'ī and other scholars have advanced a number of arguments in support of this point, but we cannot produce them here.

In order to understand the Qur'ān, you must first look to the Qur'ān itself, If that does not help, then turn to the Sunnah. The Prophet (pbuh) sent Mu'ādh to Yemen and asked him, "How will you judge the cases (that come to you)?" He replied, "I will judge according to the Book of God." "But if you do not get anything there, what will you do?" the Prophet asked. He said, "I will refer to the Sunnah of the Prophet." "But if you do not find it even there,

what will you do?" the Prophet (pbuh) asked again. He replied, "I will exercise my judgment." Hearing this the Prophet (pbuh) patted Mu'ādh on the shoulder and said, "Praise be to God, Who has guided the messenger of His Messenger to what pleases His Messenger."[38] This *ḥadīth* has been reported in the *Musnad* and *Sunan* collections of *ḥadīth* with a good *isnad.*

When you do not get any help from the Qur'ān or the Sunnah, turn to the words of the Companions, for they know the Qur'ān better. They witnessed its revelation and passed through the circumstances in which it was revealed, and knew it and understood it fully. This is particularly true of their scholars and leaders, such as the four righteous caliphs and 'Abdullah Ibn Mas'ūd.[39] It has been reported that 'Abdullah Ibn Mas'ūd said, "By the One besides Whom there is no god, there is no verse in the Qur'ān about which I do not know in what case and at what place was it revealed. If I were aware that anyone knew the Qur'ān more than I, and I could reach him, I would certainly have gone to see him."[40]

Another great scholar and savant was 'Abdullah Ibn 'Abbās,[41] the nephew of the Prophet (pbuh) and commentator of the Qur'ān. He attained that status by virtue of the Prophet's prayer, "O God! Give me knowledge of Islam and teach him the meaning of the Qur'ān."[42] 'Abdullah Ibn Mas'ūd said, "What a good interpreter of the Qur'ān Ibn 'Abbās is!"

When one does not find the *tafsīr* of the Qur'ān from the Qur'ān or the Sunnah or the words of the Companions, many scholars (*a'immah*) turn to the words of the Successors, such as Mujāhid Ibn Jubayr,[43] because he was excellent in *tafsīr.* Muḥammad Ibn Isḥāq reported from Abban Ibn Ṣāliḥ that Mujāhid said, "I read the Qur'ān with Ibn 'Abbās three times from the beginning to the end, pausing at every verse and questioning him about it." That is why Sufyān Ath-Thawrī[44] said, "If you get the *tafsīr* of Mujāhid that is sufficient."

Besides Mujāhid, you can refer to Sa'īd Ibn Jubayr,[45] Ikramah,[46] the client (*mawlā*) of Ibn 'Abbās, 'Atā' Ibn Abī Ribah,[47] Al-Ḥasan Al-Baṣrī,[48] Masrūq Ibn Al-Ajdā',[49] Sa'īd Ibn Al-Musayyib,[50] Abū Al-'Alīyah,[51] Ar-Rubay' Ibn Anas,[52] Qatādah,[53] Aḍ-Ḍaḥḥāk Ibn Muzāḥim,[54] and other Successors, or their followers, and even those who came after them.

Shu'bah[55] and others have said, "The words of the Successors (*At-Tābi'ūn*) wield no authority in matters of practical rules (*furū'*), so how can they have authority in *tafsīr?* What he meant is that the words of one Successor have no authority over another Successor who differs from him, and this is true. But when they agree on something, it undoubtedly wields authority. However, if they differ, the view of one will have no authority over others among them, nor over those who came after them. In such cases, one should turn to the language of the Qur'ān or Sunnah, or the Arabic literature in general, or the words of the Companions on that matter.

*Tafsīr* of the Qur'ān based merely on reason is forbidden (*ḥarām*). The Prophet (pbuh) said, "Whoever talks about the Qur'ān without proper knowledge makes space for himself in Hell."[56] He also said, "Whoever talks about the Qur'ān merely on the basis of his reason is a sinner, even if what he says is correct."[57] At-Tirmidhī, who reported this *ḥadīth*, said it is rare (*gharīb*). However, a number of scholars from the Companions and others have been reported to have condemned in the same vein the effort to explain the Qur'ān without knowledge.

If Mujāhid, Qatādah and other scholars like them have explained the Qur'ān, we expect that they would not have said anything about the Qur'ān or commented on its verses without proper knowledge, speaking simply on the basis of their reason. This is supported by various reports about them which say that they never said anything without knowledge and only from their minds. Hence, if one talks about the Qur'ān on the basis of his

reason, he is talking about what he does not know, and is violating the rule he has been asked to follow. Consequently, even if what he says is correct, he sins, because he has not followed the command.

However, those who made *tafsīr* because they knew the verses, their language as well as their legal and religious implications, had nothing to worry about. That is why their comments on the Qur'ān have come down to us. And this does not conflict with the attitude we have described above. They discussed things they knew, and abstained from discussing what they did not know. This is true of everyone: one must not speak about what one does not know. On the other hand, one must speak on what one knows when one is asked about it, for, that, too, is a duty, as God has said, "You must clearly explain it (i.e. the Qur'ān) to the people and never hide it" (3:187). The Prophet (pbuh) has also said, in a *ḥadīth* reported through various channels, "Whoever hides what he knows when asked about it will have a bridle of fire in his mouth on the Day of Judgment.[58] Ibn Jarīr has reported through Muḥammad Ibn Bashshār, Mu'ammal, Sufyān and Abū Az-Zanād, that Ibn 'Abbās said, "*Tafsīr* is of four kinds: one, what the Arabs can know from the language; second, what no one can be excused for not knowing; third, what only scholars know; and fourth, what God alone knows."[59]
[*Fatāwā* 13:363-375]

### (1.8) The *Muḥkam* and the *Mutashābih* in the Qur'ān

*Muḥkam in the Qur'ān may mean either what has come down from God and has not been mixed with anything extraneous, or the imperative of which has not been abrogated or qualified, or what is not vague or ambiguous. Mutashābih is the opposite of muḥkam in all these senses. However, it does not mean that we cannot understand or interpret the verses which are mutashābih in the third sense, only that part of their meaning is beyond our comprehension, and God has kept some knowledge to himself.*

*Iḥkām* in the Qur'ān is sometimes used in opposition to promptings of Satan. *Muḥkam* according to this usage is that which God has revealed and established by differentiating it from anything with which it may have been confused, or separating it from anything that may have been added to it, for *iḥkām* is to separate, distinguish, differentiate and define something, so that it is clearly determined and identified. *Iḥkām* involves negation as well as affirmation; the former is only a part not the whole of its meaning. *Iḥkām* may sometimes mean to reaffirm a verse in opposition to the claim of its abrogation in the technical sense of revoking an imperative, whether by rescinding the order or qualifying it.

*Iḥkām* is also used in the context of explication and interruption where it means to determine the real import of the verse by distinguishing it from other meanings which it might be thought to convey. Its opposite, *mutashābih*, would then mean ambiguous. A verse is *mutashābih* if it may mean more than one thing and may be taken to mean any one of them. Ibn Ḥanbāl has said that *muḥkam* is that which does not admit of difference, and *mutashābih* is that which means one thing here and another thing there. Let us note that he has not said that *mutashābih* is that whose meaning and exegesis (*tafsīr wa al-ma'nā*) is not known to anyone except God, for God has only denied that anyone other than He can know the *ta'wīl* except God" (3:7). Aḥmad is perfectly correct, for God has only denied *ta'wīl* on the part of anyone except Him In reading the verse, the stop is at the end of the word God, as is supported by many arguments; and this is the view of the Companions of the Prophet (pbuh), the majority of their Successors, and the majority of the *ummah*.

It should be noted that God has not denied the understanding and explication of *mutashābih* verses on our part. On the contrary, He has said, "(Here is) a Book which We have sent down full of

blessings, that they may ponder its verses (38:29)," and the Book contains *muḥkam* as well as *mutashābih* verses. Obviously, if we cannot understand the verses of the Book, we cannot contemplate them. God has also said, "Do they not ponder the Qur'ān?" (4:82). This is a general exhortation regarding the entire Book, from which no verse has been excepted. What God and His Prophet (pbuh) condemn is that one should pursue a *mutashābih* verse with a view to create mischief or to find out its *ta'wīl*, or ultimate meaning. They have never condemned those who contemplate its *muḥkam* or *mutashābih* verses and try to understand them and find out what they mean to the extent God wants us to understand them. On the contrary, He has positively commanded this exercise and praised those who engage in it.
[*Fatāwā* 13:274-275]

### (1.9) The Meaning of *Ta'wīl*

Ta'wīl *in the parlance of the Elders (*Salaf*) means two things: one, to explicate a passage and determine its meaning, whether such meaning agrees with the stated words of the passage or goes against them; second, is to realize what the words say. If they command something, their ta'wīl is to perform the act which they command; but if they tell of something, their ta'wīl is the happening of the thing told. However, in the language of later writers ta'wīl is to depart from the more apparent meaning of the words and adopt a less apparent meaning for some reason associated with them.*

*Ta'wīl* in the parlance of the later writers, jurists, theologians, traditionists, Ṣūfīs, and others is to leave the more apparent meaning on the basis of some reason associated with that passage. This is the *ta'wīl* which is referred to in works on the principles of jurisprudence or on legal controversies. When someone says that

this *ḥadīth* or that text is subject to *ta'wīl*, or should be interpreted to mean this and not that, others may charge him with doing *ta'wīl* and ask him to state his reasons for doing it. The one who is doing *ta'wīl* has to satisfy two conditions: first, he has to show that the words may also mean what he is suggesting, and second, he must state a reason for having to depart from the more apparent meaning in favor of his own meaning. This is also the sense in which *ta'wīl* is used in the discussions on divine attributes.

In the parlance of the Elders, however, *ta'wīl* means two things. One is to explicate (*tafsīr*) a passage and elucidate its meaning, whether or not that meaning agrees with the words of the passage. On this understanding, *ta'wīl* would mean very much the same as *tafsīr*, would be a synonym for it. This is, and God knows better, what Mujāhid implies when he says that the scholars know the *ta'wīl* of this or that verse, or when Muḥammad Ibn Jarīr Aṭ-Ṭabarī[60] writes in his commentary, "Opinions regarding the *ta'wīl* of this word (of God) are as follows...," or that "the scholars of *ta'wīl* have different opinions regarding this verse." To be sure, what he means by *ta'wīl* here is the same as *tafsīr*. explication.

The second sense in which the Elders use *ta'wīl*, and which we should count as the third sense of *ta'wīl*, is to refer to the thing itself which is intended by the words. If the words contain a command, *ta'wīl* is carrying out the thing commanded; and if the words contain information, *ta'wīl* is the occurrence of the thing informed.

*Ta'wil* in this third sense is a part of the language of the Qur'ān, for example the words of Jacob to his son, Joseph, "Thus will your Lord choose you and teach you the interpretations (*ta'wīl*) of stories and events (*aḥādīth*), and perfect His favor to you" (12:6); and the words of Joseph to his parents when the members of his larger family entered Egypt and he provided a home for them, "'Enter Egypt (all) in safety if it pleases God.' And he raised his parents high on the throne (of dignity) and they fell

down in prostration before him. He said: 'Father, this is the fulfillment (*ta'wīl*) of my vision of old; God has made it come true'" (12:99-100). The *aḥādīth* in Jacob's statement refer to visions in sleep and their *ta'wīl* means the things they point to, as is clear from Joseph's words, "'This is the *ta'wīl;* of my vision of old.'" The one versed in *ta'wīl* is the one who foretells them.

In another place God said, "If you differ on anything among yourselves, refer it to God and His Messenger, if you do believe in God and the Last Day. That is best and most commendable as *ta'wīl*" (4:59); that is, it will lead to the best and most desirable end. Here *ta'wīl* means the end of their actions of referring the matter to the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. On the other hand, *ta'wīl* in the verses quoted earlier from the *sūrah* Joseph is the interpretation (*ta'wīl*) of visions. Similarly, *ta'wīl* in the surahs, the Heights, Jonah, and the Family of 'Imrān means the interpretation of the Qur'ān.

To sum up, *ta'wīl* is that to which the words are directed, or to which they refer, or to which they point; and obviously the thing to which the words point, or refer or lead (*mustaqqar*) or which they suggest or are shown to suggest is the reality of the thing itself which is what they mean. This is borne out by the way Elders have explained the word *mustaqqar* in the verse, "Every news has its *mustaqqar*" (6:67), that is, its reality. In case the words convey an information, they will point or refer to the thing informed, but when they do not point or refer to anything, they will be void.

On the other hand, if the words contain an imperative they will lead to and end up with the thing commanded, provided it is not already accomplished. However, if the information is about something promised or warned, it will lead to the thing awaited. This is supported by the *ḥadīth* which says that the Prophet (pbuh) recited the verse, "Tell them: He has all the power to send calamities on you from above and below, or to cover you with confusion in party strife, giving you a taste of mutual vengeance -